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INTRODUCTION
On October 17, 2005, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act (BAPCPA) went into effect. Enacted after twelve years of
intense lobbying by unsecured lenders, BAPCPA represents the most sweep-
ing set of amendments to the Bankruptcy Code in over a century. BAPCPA
imposed a large number of new requirements on all consumer debtors.'
From a consumer perspective, the most dramatic change is that debtors who
have incomes above their state's median and who fail a "means test" are
1. For a list of debtors' duties, see 11 U.S.C.A. § 521 (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
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presumed to be abusing the system. If they wish to file a Chapter 7 liquida-
tion, they instead are channeled into filing Chapter 13 plans.'
Prior to the enactment of BAPCPA, most consumer debtors could elect
whether to file a petition for relief under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13.' The
benefits of consumer bankruptcy vary depending on what type of credit has
been extended to the debtor. At its most basic level, a Chapter 7 liquidation
discharges the majority of unsecured debt that a debtor owes, but it may
require the debtor to sell certain assets in which the debtor's estate has eq-
uity. In a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, a debtor forms a plan for the repayment of
certain debts. Unsecured credit, such as credit card debt, is generally dis-
chargeable in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy.4 Conversely, secured debt, such as
home mortgages, home equity loans, automobile loans, security interests in
personal property, and layaway plans are not dischargeable in consumer
bankruptcy.5 Similarly, "informal credit arrangements, such as [personal]
loans from family members, which [were] historically the dominant source
of consumer credit," are not dischargeable.6 Despite the obvious advantages
of discharging a debtor's unsecured debt, a debtor might still strategically
prefer to file a Chapter 13 case in these circumstances.
A consumer's choice whether to file a Chapter 7 case or a Chapter 13
case was, before BAPCPA, a strategic decision made based on the particular
financial circumstances of the debtor and the debtor's goals following the
discharge. With the enactment of BAPCPA, Congress and President Bush
rhetorically established a strong dichotomy between irresponsible debtors,
on the one hand, who, undeterred by the stigma of bankruptcy, increasingly
2. Under means-testing, a debtor is not eligible for a Chapter 7 discharge and,
therefore, must file in Chapter 13 and formulate a repayment plan if (1) the
debtor's annual income exceeds his or her state's median income for families
of comparable size, see id. § 707(b)(7)(A); (2) after subtracting out certain al-
lowed expenses, the debtor has sufficient income remaining to repay a sub-
stantial portion of the his or her obligations, see id. § 707(b)(2) (A); and (3) the
debtor does not have any "special circumstances, such as a serious medical
condition or a call or order to active duty... that justify additional expenses
or adjustments of current monthly income," id. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i).
3. See id. § 1O9.
4. See id. § 523 (listing certain types of debt that are not dischargeable in bank-
ruptcy, even if such debt is owed to a general, unsecured creditor). In the con-
text of credit card debt, for example, a debtor's obligation to repay might not
be dischargeable if the debtor used the credit card to purchase a certain
amount of unnecessary luxury items shortly before seeking bankruptcy pro-
tection. See id. § 523(a)(2)(c)(i)(I), (ii)(II).
5. See id. § 5o6.
6. Todd J. Zywicki, Institutions, Incentives, and Consumer Bankruptcy Reform, 62
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1071, 1111 (2005).
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file Chapter 7 liquidations to discharge their unsecured debt and, on the
other hand, Chapter 13 debtors who are responsible individuals who wish to
repay those who extended them credit. By forcing more individuals to file
Chapter 13 repayment plans, this logic suggests that more debtors will be
forced to take personal responsibility and repay their unsecured creditors.
This reasoning raises a series of important empirical questions that re-
searchers and social scientists should examine. First, were Congress and the
President responding to an actual crisis? What do we know empirically
about the triggers that cause debtors to seek bankruptcy protection? Have
bankruptcy filings increased because individuals feel less constrained by the
stigma of filing relative to the benefit of a Chapter 7 discharge of most of
their unsecured debt? Or are increased filings instead due to social and eco-
nomic issues, such as a rise in the number of people who lack health insur-
ance, lose their jobs, act as the sole care-giver of their children, or fall victim
to aggressive lending? Second, maintaining an agnostic perspective with
regard to the reasons for enacting the changes, has BAPCPA accomplished
its goals? Have the changes given rise to unintended consequences?
This Article contributes to the literature and research on the causes and
effects of BAPCPA in five principal ways. Using a proportional, stratified,
random sample of bankruptcy cases from 2004 and the twelve months after
BAPCPA went into effect, we have created an original database of cases for
every state in the Tenth Circuit. We collected a simple random sample from
2002 population data in order to confirm that 2004 was a reasonable
benchmarking year. We also created an original population database for
Colorado in regard to attorneys who represented Chapter 7 and Chapter 13
debtors in 2002, 2003, 2004, and for the year post-BAPCPA.
In this Article, we first synthesize the available empirical evidence on the
triggers for filing for bankruptcy protection and the debates and findings
from the Congressional Record. We analyze whether Congress and the
President were responding to an increasing trend toward irresponsible be-
havior or, instead, to a trend toward more social and economic crises. We
discuss filing rates as well as prior empirical research on Chapter 13 debtors.
We contextualize the findings of our study within this literature.
Second, we test whether the financial profile of debtors filing Chapter 13
repayment plans has changed pre- and post-BAPCPA. Compared with 2004
data, post-BAPCPA debtors have more debts. We find dramatic increases in
the mean value of real property, the mean value of personal property, the
mean amount of debt secured by an interest in real property, and total debt.
Third, we test whether unsecured creditors are doing better as a result of
BAPCPA. We find qualified success for unsecured creditors. The confirmed
plans of post-BAPCPA Chapter 13 debtors provide for a dramatic 77% in-
crease in payments to general unsecured creditors as compared to 2004
debtors. Debtors who filed Chapter 13 cases are repaying a greater percent-
age of their unsecured debt than they would have under either Chapter 7 or
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under pre-BAPCPA Chapter 13. However, general unsecured debt now
makes up a smaller percentage of the post-BAPCPA debtor's total debt.
That is, the total amount of debt that is to be paid through the Chapter 13
plan as a ratio to the total debt and the percent of unsecured debt to total
debt show a statistically significant reduction post-BAPCPA.
Fourth, we develop two regression models to predict the dependent
variable of total debt. When pre-BAPCPA data is considered against the
independent variables of (1) value of real property, (2) estimated unsecured
debt paid, and (3) unsecured debt owed minus unsecured debt paid, a rea-
sonable model is developed to explain 96.5% of the variation in total debt.
We find that a si increase in the estimated unsecured amount paid predicts
a $5.46 change in predicted debt pre-BAPCPA. Post-BAPCPA, different
variables predict total debt. We find that a si increase in general unsecured
debt is associated with the largest change in predicted total debt, which is
just under si. The change between pre- and post-BAPCPA periods indicates
that unsecured debt is now less predictive of total debt owed and that other
variables are accounting for this change.
Finally, using population data from Colorado in 2004, we develop a lo-
gistic regression model to predict which debtors failed to complete their
Chapter 13 repayment plans in 2004.' The logistic regression model we de-
velop is a function of the value of real property, the amount of unsecured
priority debt, the total debt, and trustee compensation. Most notably, for
2004, every additional $i,ooo of priority unsecured debt increases the pre-
dicted odds of dismissal by 387%. While not as dramatic, an increase in the
amount of each of the other independent variables in the model still pre-
dicts an increase in the likelihood of failure. The only exception is the
amount of total debt. An additional si,ooo of total debt decreases the pre-
dicted odds of dismissal by 5%.
We then applied this model to post-BAPCPA Colorado cases using dis-
criminant analysis to predict changes in the anticipated failure rate of debt-
ors to comply with their confirmed Chapter 13 plans. We predict an increase
in failure rates from 32.7% to 37.2%.8
7. Of note are the variables that were not relevant in predicting the likelihood of
plan dismissal. We were unable to develop a model based on any interaction
between the total amount of general unsecured debt, real property, or total
debt. That is, when we attempted to develop a model based on reasonable
predictions of which debtors would be most irresponsible (such as those with
the highest amount of unsecured debt or the highest ratio of unsecured debt
to real property), we were unsuccessful.
8. A more robust and statistically predictive model will be developed with a
larger data set, more jurisdictions, and more time for evidence of failure rates
post-BAPCPA to occur. However, this preliminary application can serve as a
call for further empirical research into the possibility of modeling failure and
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This study is the first comprehensive empirical analysis of BAPCPA's ef-
fectiveness and its unintended effects. However, we acknowledge that the
study is limited to the Tenth Circuit and to the first year following the en-
actment of BAPCPA. It is unknown if the findings can be generalized to
other jurisdictions. In addition, since only one year of data could be col-
lected, it is unknown whether the economic profile of debtors, attorney
numbers, and fees will change, or whether the logistic regression model
developed for 2004 will be robust, predicting failure rates post-BAPCPA.
Therefore, the public policy recommendations that flow from the statistical
analysis must be seen as preliminary.
In Part I, we review changes in filing rates over time and contextualize
past empirical research and debates regarding what we know about debtors
and their reasons for seeking bankruptcy protection. In Part II, we discuss
congressional testimony and findings that purport to explain the increase in
filings, as well as the ways in which Congress and the President intended
BAPCPA to address those findings. In Part III, we discuss prior empirical
research concerning Chapter 13 debtors and BAPCPA. In Part IV, we discuss
Tenth Circuit filing rates. In Part V, we present the methodology and statis-
tical techniques used in completing our study. In Part VI, we contextualize
our findings and discuss the preliminary public policy implications they
raise.
I. THE DEBTORS: WHO ARE THEY AND WHY ARE THEY FILING?
A. The Empirical Evidence
In the past three decades, America has witnessed a dramatic increase in
the number of consumer bankruptcies filed annually.9 In 1980, approxi-
mately 287,000 consumers filed for bankruptcy in the United States.1" By
to the possibility to develop public policy recommendations based on vari-
ables associated with failure.
9. See News Release, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy Cases Con-
tinue To Break Federal Court Caseload Records: Total Bankruptcy Filings and
Non-Business Filings Hit Highs (Aug. 18, 2003), available at
http://www.nacm.org/resource/nacmnews/bank update_8-18-o3.pdf; Am.
Bankr. Inst., Bankruptcy Filing Statistics-Annual Filings, http://www.abi-
world.org/statistics (follow "Annual U.S. Filings" hyperlink) (last visited Nov.
8, 2007) (providing data about non-business bankruptcy filings in the United
States 198o-20o6).
10. See Am. Bankr. Inst., Bankruptcy Filing Statistics-Filings by Chapter,
http://www.abiworld.org/statistics (follow "Filings by Chapter" hyperlink)
(last visited Nov. 8, 2007) (providing data for 198o at "Annual Non-business
Filings by Chapter (198o-1984)" hyperlink).
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1985, that number had climbed to approximately 340,000." Five years later,
in 1990, the number had more than doubled, with approximately 700,000
consumers seeking bankruptcy protection.' 2 In 1996, the number of con-
sumer bankruptcies filed in the United States surpassed one million in a
single year for the first time. 13 When the number of filings surpassed the
one-million-filings-per-year milestone, the credit industry strengthened its
long-time plea to Congress to address the "bankruptcy crisis"' 4 by restruc-
turing the bankruptcy laws. According to the credit industry, American
families could file for bankruptcy protection much too easily.'" The credit
industry found support for this argument as the number of consumer bank-
ruptcies continued to sky-rocket. By 2004, the number of consumer bank-
ruptcies filed throughout the year surpassed one-and-a-half million. 6
These dramatically increasing filing rates led the credit industry to
speculate that Americans were substantially abusing the bankruptcy sys-
tem.' 7 Substantial abuse generally involves a debtor filing for bankruptcy
11. See id. (providing data for 1985 at "Annual Non-business Filings by Chapter
(1985-1989)" hyperlink).
12. See id. (providing data for 199o at "Annual Non-business Filings by Chapter
(1990-1994)" hyperlink).
13. See Elizabeth Warren, The Bankruptcy Crisis, 73 IND. L.J. 1079, 1079 (1998);
Am. Bankr. Inst., Bankruptcy Filing Statistics-Filings by Chapter,
http://www.abiworld.org/statistics (follow "Filings by Chapter" hyperlink)
(last visited Nov. 8, 2007) (providing data for 1996 at "Annual Non-business
Filings by Chapter (1995-1999)" hyperlink).
14. Warren, supra note 13, at 1079.
15. See id.
16. See Am. Bankr. Inst., Bankruptcy Filing Statistics-Annual Filings,
http://www.abiworld.org/statistics (follow "Filings by State" hyperlink) (last
visited Nov. 8, 2007) (providing data for 2004 at "Annual Business and Non-
business Filings by State (2000-20o6)" hyperlink). Notably, the number of
consumer bankruptcies filed in 2005 surpassed two million. See id. (providing
data for 2005 at "Annual Business and Non-business Filings by State (2000-
2006)" hyperlink); Press Release, Am. Bankr. Inst., Total Bankruptcies Eclipse
the 2 Million Mark in 2005 as Consumers File in Record Numbers Prior to
Implementation of New Bankruptcy Law (Mar. 24, 2oo6), http://www.abi-
world.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID=42631&TEMPL
ATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm. However, this figure, while significant, was
probably skewed as debtors nationwide rushed to file for bankruptcy protec-
tion before the new bankruptcy amendments took effect on October 17, 2005.
See Eric Dash, Size of Bankruptcy Bubble Surprises Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25,
2005, at Ci. In the ten days prior to the amendments becoming effective, more
than 50o,ooo Americans filed for bankruptcy. Id.
17. See Warren, supra note 13, at 1O8O.
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
when he or she actually has the ability to repay the debt that will be dis-
charged once the bankruptcy filing is complete.'" A debtor who files for
bankruptcy protection under Chapter 7 receives a discharge of most of the
debtor's obligations 9 so long as the debtor has complied with the require-
ments of the Bankruptcy Code.2" On the other hand, a debtor who files for
bankruptcy protection under Chapter 13 formulates a plan to repay the
debtor's obligations over no more than a five-year period.2' The overwhelm-
ing majority of consumer bankruptcy cases filed prior to BAPCPA were
Chapter 7 cases.
22
In fact, Chapter 7 bankruptcies have constituted the bulk of consumer
bankruptcies for some time. For example, in 2005, of the approximately two
million consumer bankruptcies filed, more than 1.5 million were Chapter 7
cases.23 In the previous year, approximately i.1 million of the more than 1.5
million consumer bankruptcy cases filed were Chapter 7 cases.24 Similarly,
more than 70% of the consumer bankruptcy cases filed in 2003 were Chap-
18. See Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It's Time for Means Testing, 1999 BYU
L. REV. 177, 199; Warren, supra note 13, at 1O81. According to the credit indus-
try, consumers substantially abuse the bankruptcy system when they "tak[e]
advantage of their creditors and us[e] the bankruptcy system to shuck legal
responsibilities they otherwise could have easily met." Warren, supra note 13,
at 1o8o. Similarly, the criterion for substantial abuse under the bankruptcy
system depends on the ability of the debtor to repay the debtor's obligations.
See Jones & Zywicki, supra, at 199 ("[T]he primary factor in determining
whether 'substantial abuse' exists is the debtor's ability to pay.").
19. See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2000) (listing certain types of debts that are not discharge-
able in Chapter 7 bankruptcy).
20. See id. § 727.
21. See id. § 1322.
22. See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy Statistics, http://www.us-
courts.gov/bnkrpctystats/statistics.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2007) (reporting
data about bankruptcy filings 1983-2o6); Am. Bankr. Inst., Bankruptcy Filing
Statistics-Filings by Chapter, http://www.abiworld.org/statistics (follow "Fil-
ings by Chapter" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 8, 2007) (providing data about
non-business bankruptcy filings 198o-1999).
23. The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts provides statistics about bank-
ruptcy filings online at http://www.uscourts.gov/bnkrpctystats/statistics.htm.
The number of consumer bankruptcy filings in 2005 can be found in an Excel
file available on that site. See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy
Statistics, http://www.uscourts.gov/bnkrpctystats/statistics.htm (last visited
Nov. 8, 2007) (providing file at "2005 Calendar Year by Chapter" hyperlink).
24. See id. (providing 2004 bankruptcy filings data at "2004 Calendar Year by
Chapter" hyperlink).
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ter 7 cases. 5 In 1996, when the number of filings per year first surpassed one
million, more than 700,000 of the filings were Chapter 7 cases.2 6 Even look-
ing as far back as 198o, when less than 300,000 consumer bankruptcies were
filed, almost 75% of those cases were Chapter 7 cases. 7
Because of the prevalence of Chapter 7 cases, both the credit card indus-
try and bankruptcy scholars speculated that too many debtors were filing for
Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection, seeking a discharge of most of their debt
even though they could have afforded to pay most, if not all, of their debt
obligations under a Chapter 13 repayment plan.28 Congress could reduce or,
ideally, eliminate this alleged abuse by amending the Bankruptcy Code to
force those who could afford to repay their debt into Chapter 13 repayment
plans.29 The credit industry in particular adamantly supported amending
the Bankruptcy Code, because as unsecured, non-priority creditors, credit
card companies almost never receive distributions from debtors' estates in
Chapter 7 cases.30 If Congress could force more debtors into Chapter 13,
unsecured, non-priority creditors like credit card companies could in theory
recover more of the overall amount owed to them.3 ' Under the proposed
amendments, debtors who met certain criteria related to their ability to
repay some of their debts would be steered to Chapter 13 repayment plans.
3 2
25. See id. (providing 2003 bankruptcy filings data at "2003 Calendar Year by
Chapter" hyperlink).
26. Am. Bankr. Inst., Bankruptcy Filing Statistics-Filings by Chapter,
http://www.abiworld.org/statistics (follow "Filings by Chapter" hyperlink)
(last visited Nov. 8, 2007) (providing data for 1996 at "Annual Non-business
Filings by Chapter (1995-1999)" hyperlink).
27. See id. (providing data for 198o at "Annual Non-business Filings by Chapter
(198o-1984)" hyperlink).
28. See generally Jones & Zywicki, supra note 18, at 187; Warren, supra note 13, at
1089.
29. Jones & Zywicki, supra note 18, at 181-86.
30. See id. at 185-86.
31. See id.
32. It is appropriate to question whether those who file under Chapter 13 are truly
the "responsible" debtors (i.e., those who recognize their ability to repay
most, if not all, of their debt over a period of five years or less). Many debtors
actually use Chapter 13 as a mechanism to protect their homes from foreclo-
sure and "to cure a mortgage arrearage over a several year period," not to ful-
fill their obligation to repay their debts because they have the means to do so.
Melissa B. Jacoby, Bankruptcy Reform and Homeownership Risk, 2007 U. ILL.
L. REV. 323, 325.
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B. The Debtors: Who Are They?
This growing consumer bankruptcy trend might have seemed "striking"
because it occurred during a period of economic prosperity that was charac-
terized by low unemployment rates and low interest rates.33 As the number
of consumer bankruptcies continued to climb during this period of eco-
nomic prosperity, questions about who was filing for consumer bankruptcy
began to surface.34 Writing pre-BAPCPA, Professor Elizabeth Warren found
that the central question was whether those seeking bankruptcy protection
were among the poorest of American families or whether they were typical
middle-class families:
Could it be us? Are the families in bankruptcy some others: people
who live lives very different from our own, people who have fewer
opportunities than we have, people who are subject to very different
risks from those we face? Or are these debtors us: typical middle-
class people who work hard, play by the rules, and somehow end up
in financial collapse?35
Surprisingly, the answer is that the overwhelming majority of debtors are
"not the chronically poor relegated to some remote ghetto"; rather, they are
our nearby neighbors," typical middle-class American families.36
One way to differentiate among the classes is by income.37 However, in
the bankruptcy context, this measure of class status may be deceptive.3"
Debtors filing for bankruptcy typically have incomes well below median.39
Thus, based solely on the low income of consumer debtors, it may seem as
though most of those filing for bankruptcy are poor, lower-class, and, per-
haps, irresponsible individuals who are spending money they do not have
and acquiring debt they cannot afford to repay." However, this measure of
33. See Elizabeth Warren, Financial Collapse and Class Status: Who Goes Bank-
rupt?, 41 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 115, 116 (2003); Zywicki, supra note 6, at 1072.
34. See Warren, supra note 33, at 118.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 118-19; accord Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, Twenty-First Century Bankruptcy: Two Decades of Evidence
About Consumer Debt and the Stigma of Bankruptcy 6 (Oct. 19, 2005) (un-
published manuscript, on file with author).
37. Warren, supra note 33, at 123.
38. See Sullivan et al., supra note 36, at 6; Warren, supra note 33, at 123.
39. Sullivan et al., supra note 36, at 7-8; Warren, supra note 33, at 124-25. For ex-
ample, in 2001, the median income of debtors who filed for bankruptcy was
approximately $24,000, whereas the median household income in the United
States was approximately $42,000. Warren, supra note 33, at 125.
40. See Sullivan et al., supra note 36, at 6.
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class status fails to consider that many debtors who file for bankruptcy do so
only after experiencing some type of interruption in income.4 In general,
debtors who file for consumer bankruptcy protection have substantially
higher incomes when they acquire their debt than when they file for bank-
ruptcy. Oftentimes, as a result of some type of income interruption, such as
a job loss or a failed small business, debtors' income decreases substantially.
They can no longer afford to pay the obligations they incurred when their
income was higher and, as a result, go bankrupt.42 In addition to job-related
income interruptions, many debtors go bankrupt as a result of unexpected
injury and medical bills or family tragedy, such as divorce or death in the
family.43
Therefore, for a more accurate portrayal of who is most in need of con-
sumer bankruptcy protection, it is necessary to consider factors other than
income that are also indicative of class status.44 Professors Teresa Sullivan,
Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Westbrook conducted three independent studies
of consumer debt and bankrupt debtors over a period of twenty years that
provide viable alternatives for evaluating who files for bankruptcy. 4 Taking
education, occupation, and home ownership as indicators of class status,
Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook concluded that "bankruptcy is a middle
class phenomenon" and that bankrupt debtors are "solidly middle-class
citizens.
46
As Americans in general continue to become better educated, the edu-
cation levels of those filing for bankruptcy have "[kept] pace."47 In fact,
bankrupt debtors are more likely to have gone to college than the average
American. 48 Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook conclude that bankrupt debt-
41. See id. at 8; accord Warren, supra note 33, at 125-27.
42. See Sullivan et al., supra note 36, at 6, 8; Warren, supra note 33, at 125-27.
43. See Elizabeth Warren, Show Me the Money, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2005, at A21.
44. Warren, supra note 33, at 127.
45. See Sullivan et al., supra note 36, at 4-6 (describing the methodology behind
the 1981, 1991, and 2001 studies conducted by Sullivan, Warren, and West-
brook).
46. See Warren, supra note 33, at 127-44 (explaining how the data regarding the
education, occupation, and home ownership status of debtors indicate that
the overwhelming majority of debtors filing for consumer bankruptcy are
middle class).
47. Id. at 128.
48. Id. at 130. However, bankrupt debtors are also less likely than the general
population to complete their college education and earn their college degrees.
Id.
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ors "are not concentrated among the uneducated or poorly educated."49
Rather, if education is an appropriate measure of class status, "bankrupt
debtors appear to be an educational cross-section of all adults in the United
States."5 Thus, according to Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook, the educa-
tion levels of those filing for consumer bankruptcy indicate that most bank-
rupt debtors are middle class.
Similarly, bankrupt debtors generally have occupations that indicate
that they are well situated among the middle class.5 ' While Sullivan, Warren,
and Westbrook admit that the data are inconclusive in determining whether
"the individuals filing for bankruptcy kept pace with occupational changes
in the general population, "52 patterns in the data indicate that bankrupt
debtors tended to model the American population in terms of job prestige.53
Thus, they conclude that if occupational prestige is indicative of class status,
"the bankrupt population has remained largely middle class."54
Furthermore, in 2001, slightly more than 50% of bankrupt debtors
owned homes.55 According to Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook, home
ownership is a solid predictor of class status:56 "Home ownership signals
social standing, and most Americans aspire to own their own homes."5 7 A
homeowner has "committed to sound financial planning" and demon-
strated "some habit of thrift" by saving income in excess of living expenses
to make a down payment. A homeowner has undergone "searching finan-
cial scrutiny" and has "likely survived the most aggressive credit screen [he
or she] will ever encounter." A homeowner has secured a good job and a
substantial work history and proven that he or she can manage credit.
5 1
Thus, that more than 50% of debtors owned homes at the time they filed for
49. Id. at 131.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 131-36.
52. Id. at 135.
53. See id. at 136.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 138. To be more exact, in 2001, 52.5% of debtors were homeowners when
they filed for bankruptcy. Id. Notably, however, the percentage of bankrupt
homeowners might actually be higher. Id. Some debtors, as a result of their
financial troubles, lose their homes prior to filing for bankruptcy. Id. at 138-
40. Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook suggest that "[w] hen the current home-
owners and the past homeowners are combined, the home ownership rate
among the debtors in bankruptcy climbs to 58.31%]." Id. at 140-41.
56. See id. at 136-37.
57. Id. at 136.
58. Id. at 136-37.
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bankruptcy indicates that "a substantial portion of the bankrupt population
has accomplished one of the main goals of many middle-class families:
home ownership." 9 Based on this critical statistic, more than half of the
debtors filing for consumer bankruptcy protection appear to be middle
class.
While each of these factors individually indicates that the many bank-
rupt debtors are middle class, considering all three factors concurrently
provides even stronger evidence that "the overwhelming majority of indi-
viduals filing for bankruptcy could stake a legitimate claim to middle-class
status."'6 Even though the median household income of those filing for
bankruptcy suggests that the individuals seeking bankruptcy protection are
among the chronically poor, the education, occupation, and home owner-
ship of such individuals shows otherwise.6 When considering these factors
in conjunction with one another, more than 90% of bankrupt debtors meet
at least one of the middle-class criteria, approximately 67% meet two of
these criteria, and nearly 30% meet all three.62 Sullivan, Warren, and West-
brook conclude:
[B]ankruptcy is a system that serves families on the way down.
These individuals evidence substantial participation in activities that
usually signal economic success-college, good jobs, and home
ownership-but something has gone badly wrong that results in
their financial collapse. The data on job difficulties suggest that lay-
offs, cutbacks, and business collapses constitute an important ele-
ment of their collective failure; more than two-thirds of the debtors
give one or more indications of a significant job problem before
they file. Other reasons relating to medical debts, divorce, or their
own inability to handle credit may also figure importantly in their
financial demise.... [T]he sharp rise in bankruptcy filings cannot
be attributed to a large number of chronically poor debtors-
people with no skills and no prospects-who end up in financial
collapse.... [W]hatever their current economic circumstances, the
families in bankruptcy share many of the same educational, occupa-
59. Id. at 142.
60. Id. at 144.
61. An interesting issue raised by our editor is whether we need to develop a more
robust measure of what it means to be middle class. It is possible that the sta-
tistics cited include individuals who were middle class by the criteria used by
researchers but moving towards a lower socio-economic status based on a
pivotal event in their lives. Prior research presents a vivid snapshot of the
debtor but may not fully capture class mobility. While beyond the scope of
this Article, it is a theoretical and methodological challenge worth addressing.
62. Warren, supra note 33, at 144.
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tional, and home buying experiences as other middle-class Ameri-
cans. Their deep financial distress suggests a growing reason for
concern about these families, who make up the heart of America.63
C. The Debtors: Why Are They Filing?
While the question of which Americans are most in need of consumer
bankruptcy protection is an important one, it has not sparked as much de-
bate as the question of why so many individuals file for bankruptcy. As the
number of consumer bankruptcy filings has dramatically increased over the
past three decades,6' scholars, government officials, credit industry execu-
tives, and reporters have speculated about the cause of the growing con-
sumer bankruptcy trend.65
Among scholars, two opposing views have emerged. Some believe that
too many of the individuals who file for consumer bankruptcy protection
are irresponsible debtors who consciously choose to file for consumer bank-
ruptcy rather than reduce their own spending or tap into their savings in
order to satisfy their debt obligations.66 These scholars attribute the high
number of consumers seeking bankruptcy protection to several factors: the
increased economic benefit and decreased economic costs of bankruptcy;
the decreased social stigma associated with filing bankruptcy; and the in-
creased use of general, unsecured credit.67
However, other scholars take a more sympathetic view of debtors who
file for consumer bankruptcy protection. These scholars attribute the need
for consumer bankruptcy in the majority of cases to forces beyond debtors'
control: a dramatic change in the debtor's income or expenses, such as a job
loss or the failure of a small business;68 unexpected illness and the resulting
medical bills;69 the financial stresses associated with having and raising chil-
63. Id. at 144-46.
64. See supra Section I.A.
65. See Rafael Efrat, Bankruptcy Stigma: Plausible Causes for Shifting Norms, 22
EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 481, 485 (2006).
66. See, e.g., id. (discussing the decreasing social stigma of consumer bankruptcy
and the shift away from the "traditional" view of bankrupt debtors as overin-
dulging and financially irresponsible); Zywicki, supra note 6, at 1072; see also
David Frum, Bankruptcy Reform Is a Moral Issue, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2000, at
A14 (suggesting that Americans have "figured out" how to use the consumer
bankruptcy system to avoid repaying their debts).
67. See Zywicki, supra note 6, at 1078-121.
68. See, e.g., Sullivan et al., supra note 36, at 6, 8; Warren, supra note 33, at 125-27.
69. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 43. See generally Melissa B. Jacoby, Teresa A.
Sullivan & Elizabeth Warren, Rethinking the Debates Over Health Care Financ-
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dren that are unique to the middle class in our current economic struc-
ture;70 or some type of family tragedy, such as divorce or the death of an
income-earning family member.7'
This Section of the Article examines these opposing views in more de-
tail, focusing on the writings of Professor Todd Zywicki, who has been
called the "most prominent professorial proponent of [the Bankruptcy
Amendments]"7 ' and of means-testing 73 in general. 74 This Section will also
focus on the conclusions of Professors Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook,
who, after conducting three independent studies of the debtors who file for
consumer bankruptcy protection, seem to agree that the Bankruptcy
Amendments will not address the real causes of the growing consumer
bankruptcy trend: job instability, inadequate health care, death, divorce, and
other tragic events beyond debtors' control.75
ing: Evidence from the Bankruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375 (2001) (find-
ing that "hundreds of thousands of middle-class families in the United States
are devastated economically each year under the current health care finance
system" and, therefore, that a significant number of middle class families
must "turn[ I to the bankruptcy courts for help after illness or injury").
70. See generally Elizabeth Warren, Bankrupt Children, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1003
(2002) (discussing the unique expenses and financial considerations associ-
ated with raising children and concluding that "our economic structures are
putting middle-class families rearing children at a disproportionate economic
risk").
71. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 43.
72. David G. Epstein, A Few Lines, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1291,1292 n.7 (20o6).
73. Under means-testing, a debtor is not eligible for a Chapter 7 discharge and,
therefore, must file in Chapter 13 and formulate a repayment plan if three
conditions are met: (1) the debtor's annual income exceeds the state median
income for families of the same size, 11 U.S.C.A. § 7 07(b)(7) (A) (West 2004 &
Supp. 2007); (2) after subtracting out certain allowed expenses, the debtor has
sufficient income remaining to repay a substantial portion of the debtor's ob-
ligations, id. § 7o7(b)(2)(A); and (3) the debtor does not have any "special cir-
cumstances, such as a serious medical condition or a call or order to active
duty.., that justify additional expenses or adjustments of current monthly
income," id. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i).
74. See Zywicki, supra note 6, at 1123-24. See generally Jones & Zywicki, supra note
18 (advocating for means-testing).
75. See Warren, supra note 43.
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1. Increased Economic Benefit, Decreased Economic Cost, Decreased
Social Stigma, and Increased Use of General Unsecured Debt
Proponents of bankruptcy reform like Professor Zywicki argue that the
growing bankruptcy trend cannot be explained by "unexpected income or
expense shocks, such as unemployment, divorce, or health problems."76
Rather, those in favor of bankruptcy reform argue that the increase in con-
sumer bankruptcy is caused by the ease with which debtors can seek bank-
ruptcy protection.77 The ease of filing for consumer bankruptcy can be ex-
plained by the shifting costs of bankruptcy protection, the decrease in the
personal shame and the social stigma associated with bankruptcy, and the
change in the nature of consumer credit in the American economy today.78
a. Increased Economic Benefits and Decreased Economic
Costs
Most agree that the economic benefits of filing for consumer bank-
ruptcy have increased over the past twenty-five years, while the economic
costs of bankruptcy have decreased.79 When Congress enacted the 1978
Bankruptcy Code, it did not seem very concerned about placing restrictions
on a debtor's ability to file for consumer bankruptcy, "regardless of the
debtor's need for bankruptcy relief or ability to repay.., debts."8 ° However,
76. Zywicki, supra note 6, at 1072.
77. See id.; see also Warren, supra note 13, at 1079 (noting that the credit industry
strengthened its plea to Congress for bankruptcy reform when the number of
consumer bankruptcy filings surpassed the one-million-filings-per-year mile-
stone because, in its view, American families could file for bankruptcy much
too easily).
78. See, e.g., Efrat, supra note 65, at 488-517 (discussing the possible causes of the
decrease in the stigma associated with filing for consumer bankruptcy protec-
tion); Zywicki, supra note 6, at 1078-121.
79. Zywicki, supra note 6, at 1079.
80. Id. at lO8O-81. The legislative history to the 1978 Code indicates that Congress
was not concerned with the debtor's ability to repay the debtor's obligations.
See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 94 (1978). Under the 1978 Code, when determining
whether to dismiss a petition for consumer bankruptcy, courts were in-
structed not to consider the debtor's ability to repay:
[The Code] authorizes the court to dismiss a liquidation case only
for cause, such as unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial
to creditors or nonpayment of any fees and charges required ....
These causes are not exhaustive, but merely illustrative. [The Code]
does not contemplate, however, that the ability of the debtor to re-
pay... debts in whole or in part constitutes adequate cause for dis-
missal. To permit dismissal on that ground would be to enact a non-
uniform mandatory Chapter 13, in lieu of the remedy of bankruptcy.
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when Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code in 1984, it added section
707(b) to allow bankruptcy judges to dismiss a consumer bankruptcy peti-
tion for substantial abuse.8' "Substantial abuse" typically exists when debt-
ors file for bankruptcy even though they have the ability to repay the debt
they are seeking to discharge.8 2 In practice, bankruptcy judges have used this
power "rarely, sporadically, and inconsistently to police debtor opportun-
ism." 8' 3 Therefore, while the pre-BAPCPA Bankruptcy Code had provisions
to prevent debtors from seeking discharges when they had the ability to
repay their obligations, the Code was ineffective and "[did] little in practice
to reduce the economic benefits associated with filing bankruptcy, even for
those with high repayment capacity.
84
The clearest economic benefit associated with bankruptcy is, of course,
the ability to discharge financial obligations.8 5 As a result of this economic
advantage, it is not surprising that "with a modest degree of prebankruptcy
planning, more than half of American households could gain financially
from filing bankruptcy, with the financial benefit being greatest for well-off
debtors."8 6 However, bankruptcy offers other, more intangible benefits as
well. 7
In addition to debt discharges, bankruptcy petitioners immediately re-
ceive the benefits of an automatic stay.88 An automatic stay immediately
prevents creditors from attempting to collect pre-petition debts, even if such
Id. (emphasis added).
81. Zywicki, supra note 6, at 1o81.
82. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
83. Zywicki, supra note 6, at 1o81 & n.22.
84. Id. at 1o81.
85. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 727 (West 2004 & Supp. 2007) (explaining the debtor's right
to discharge); cf id. § 523 (listing certain types of obligations that are not dis-
chargeable in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy).
86. See Zywicki, supra note 6, at io8i. Of course, while facially true as a snapshot,
the filing of a bankruptcy petition does entail significant ongoing detriments
such as affecting credit scores, liquidity, the ability to obtain favorable bor-
rowing rates, the ability to obtain security clearances, etc.
87. See id. at 1082-89.
88. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007). The automatic stay oper-
ates to prevent creditors from recovering any property from the debtor. See
ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS
AND CREDITORS 196 ( 4th ed. 2001). It has been "likened to 'closing the win-
dows and locking the doors' to prevent any property from the leaving the
newly formed estate." Id.
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collection efforts were initiated prior to the debtor filing for bankruptcy.89
"[T]he primary goal of bankruptcy filers is 'stopping creditors' collection
efforts (foreclosure, repossession, suit, garnishment, phone calls, letters,
home visits)."9" The automatic stay, therefore, is a powerful incentive for
filing bankruptcy. It may persuade some debtors to file for bankruptcy pro-
tection simply to avoid collection efforts by creditors.9' Moreover, by pre-
venting a creditor from collecting on a debt, the automatic stay allows the
debtor to retain, at least temporarily, property that may rightfully belong to
a secured creditor. 92
Another economic incentive associated with filing for bankruptcy pro-
tection is the ability of the debtor to "protect substantial property through
property exemptions."93 The property exemptions in the Bankruptcy Code
dictate both the type and the amount of property that a debtor can keep
when filing for bankruptcy.94 Essentially, the property exemptions remove
specific amounts of certain categories of property from the reach of credi-
tors. 9 Property exemptions exist for the benefit and the protection of the
debtor:
Bankruptcy makes property exemptions available to debtors in
order to prevent a debtor from emerging from bankruptcy free of
debt but utterly without assets. Exemptions were designed to pro-
tect the debtor's "fresh start," the means by which the debtor can
begin a new, economically productive life.96
89. See ii U.S.C.A. § 362(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
90. Zywicki, supra note 6, at 1o82 (quoting Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer
Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501, 522 (1993)).
91. See id.; see also WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 88, at 196, 515.
92. See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 88, at 515.
93. Zywicki, supra note 6, at 1084; see ii U.S.C. § 522(d) (2000).
94. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007) (listing both the amounts
and the categories of property that a debtor may exempt under federal law).
The Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor to choose between the federal property
exemptions and the property exemptions of the state in which the debtor is
filing for bankruptcy protection, unless such state has opted out of the federal
scheme. See id. § 522. If the state has opted out, "a debtor filing for federal
bankruptcy.., can exempt only property protected under that state's laws."
WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 88, at 207. As of 2001, thirty-nine states
had opted out of the federal scheme. Id.
95. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 5 22(d) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
96. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 88, at 207.
26 : 135 2007
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF BAPCPA
In fact, the second most prominent reason debtors give for filing for bank-
ruptcy is to "keep[ ] property, often serving as collateral, such as homes,
cars, and household belongings.""
However, "because of the property-based nature of bankruptcy exemp-
tions, [the benefit of such exemptions] rises as household wealth rises."98
This may refute the argument that more Americans are filing for bank-
ruptcy because of unanticipated financial crises. It suggests instead that the
increase in bankruptcy filings is a result of the desire of debtors to "shield
more wealth in bankruptcy."99 This is especially true since property exemp-
tions have become more debtor-friendly, as "several states have recently
created homestead exemptions or increased their cap on their homestead
exemptions" and have created and recognized new categories of exemp-
tions, such as exemptions for retirement accounts.10
0
While the economic benefits of filing for bankruptcy protection have
increased, the economic costs associated with learning about and filing for
consumer bankruptcy have decreased.'0 ' As these economic costs fall, the
demand for consumer bankruptcy increases. 0 2 In particular, the costs asso-
ciated with learning about consumer bankruptcy protection (called "search
costs"), the costs associated with filing for consumer bankruptcy protection
(called "transaction costs"), and the greater availability of post-bankruptcy
credit to debtors have all contributed to the dramatic rise in consumer
bankruptcy filings.'03
In the past, it was more difficult and expensive for debtors to learn
about the potential benefits of consumer bankruptcy. 104 However, today, the
American population is inundated with information about the benefits of
bankruptcy. 105 Debtors can receive information about consumer bankruptcy
through inexpensive, easily accessible sources, 10 6 such as advertisements by
97. Zywicki, supra note 6, at 1o82 (quoting Braucher, supra note 9o, at 522).
98. Id. at lO84.
99. Id. at 1O87.
100. Id. at lO86-87.
101. See id. at 1O89-96.
102. Id. at 09o.
103. See id. at lO9O-96.
104. Id. at 1092-93 ("That information costs about bankruptcy are a significant
barrier to filing bankruptcy is evidenced in... [the] observation that one of
the biggest difficulties for a lawyer meeting with a new client is persuading the
client that the bankruptcy system truly is as generous as it seems to be-i.e.,
there is no catch.")
105. See id. at 1090-94.
106. See id.
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attorneys, media attention given to high-profile celebrities who have filed
for bankruptcy, and family and friends who have personally experienced the
benefits of filing for consumer bankruptcy.107 As more Americans gain ac-
cess to such information, the public is becoming more aware of the substan-
tial benefits of consumer bankruptcy at a lower price than in previous
years. 108
Furthermore, the transaction costs associated with the process of filing
for consumer bankruptcy protection have also decreased.'19 As the number
of consumer bankruptcy filings has reached record numbers, some attor-
neys have been able to form so-called "bankruptcy mills.""' These high-
volume preparers function on the assumption that filing consumer bank-
ruptcy petitions is a standard process that can, in many cases, be accom-
plished with the use of bankruptcy-specific computer software."' They aim
to spit out a high volume of cookie-cutter bankruptcy pleadings." 2 Ulti-
mately, debtors have benefited considerably from the high-volume, repeti-
tive process employed by these firms, as the firms have substantially reduced
the filing costs involved in filing for consumer bankruptcy.13
In addition to bankruptcy mills, do-it-yourself bankruptcy guides in
books and on the Internet have helped lower the transaction costs of filing
for bankruptcy." 4 These guides are available to almost all debtors, even
those who are unable to pay a lawyer; they provide debtors with all of the
information and forms necessary to file for consumer bankruptcy protec-
tion." 5
Finally, another declining bankruptcy cost is the effect of bankruptcy on
debtors' access to post-bankruptcy credit." 6 Though bankruptcy once
"cripple[d] the ability [of the debtor] to acquire new credit following bank-
ruptcy,"" 7 today a majority of bankruptcy filers are able to obtain credit
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 1094-95.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 1094.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 1095.
115. Seeid.
116. Id. at 1095-96.
117. Id. (noting that more than ten years ago only about sixteen percent of bank-
ruptcy petitioners were able to gain unsecured credit within one year after fil-
ing for bankruptcy but also noting that a recent survey indicates that "three-
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within only one year of filing.' The traditional notion-that filing for
bankruptcy will destroy a debtor's credit for years to come-is no longer
true. 19
b. Decreased Social Stigma
Another explanation of the dramatic increase in consumer bankruptcy
filings is the claim that the last three decades have seen a decline in the social
stigma associated with filing for bankruptcy. z Traditionally, American
society looked down on consumers who filed for bankruptcy protection.
1 2 1
This stigma arose, at least in part, because bankruptcy was considered to be
the fault of the debtor. 22 Society viewed bankrupt debtors as financially
irresponsible and overindulging.' 23 Moreover, filing for bankruptcy was
viewed as "contrary to the traditional American norms of trust, honor, and
thrift."'124 While there is undoubtedly still some stigma associated with filing
for consumer bankruptcy protection, 125 many claim that the impact of such
stigma has declined, "reduc[ing] the negative impact that an individual will
suffer to his personal reputation by filing bankruptcy [and] making indi-
viduals more willing to file."'
126
Even though it is difficult to determine the exact cause of the decrease in
the social stigma associated with bankruptcy-or even to determine
whether a decline in social stigma has in fact occurred' 2 7-numerous factors
quarters of bankruptcy filers have at least one credit card within a year after
filing").
118. See id. at 1o96.
119. Of course, while the change in this perception arguably no longer serves as a
significant deterrent to the decision to file bankruptcy, there are a number of
short and long term negative consequences that may flow from the decision
to do so. See supra note 88.
120. Zywicki, supra note 6, at o96-no. See generally Efrat, supra note 65 (discuss-
ing the possible causes of the decrease in the stigma associated with filing for
consumer bankruptcy protection).
121. Efrat, supra note 65, at 482.
122. Id. at 484.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 484-85.
125. See id. at 485.
126. Zywicki, supra note 6, at 1097; see also Efrat, supra note 65, at 488-519; Zywicki,
supra note 6, at 1o96-no.
127. See Sullivan et al., supra note 36, at 14-22. Professors Teresa Sullivan, Elizabeth
Warren, and Jay Westbrook assert that the social stigma associated with filing
for consumer bankruptcy protection may have increased over the past three
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could have contributed to the phenomenon. One explanation is the chang-
ing culture of many American neighborhoods. 128 Empirical evidence sug-
gests that an individual is more likely to file for bankruptcy if there are other
people in the individual's community who have recently filed for bank-
ruptcy.'29 In large communities, where residents "possess less knowledge of
their neighbors' reputations" and are thus "less likely to fear their disap-
proval," bankruptcy filings are higher than they are in smaller, more closely
knit neighborhoods. 130
Similarly, "[slocieties with higher patterns of migration ... tend to have
higher bankruptcy filing rates, presumably because more transient popula-
tions will tend to have more attenuated social ties, less concern about social
reputation, and weaker norms."'' These statistics further show that the
potential for reputational damage plays an important role in an individual's
decision to file for bankruptcy, 132 lending support to the assertion that the
increase in consumer bankruptcy filings is due, at least in part, to a decline
in bankruptcy's social stigma.
33
decades. See id. at 20-22. They note that there is now a greater likelihood that
a petitioner's bankruptcy filing will become public because this information,
while it has always been a matter of public record, is now very easy to access.
See id. at 20-21. Furthermore, Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook hypothesize
that the credit industry may have contributed to an increase in the stigma as-
sociated with consumer bankruptcy filing because "the industry has hired
multiple public relations firms to drive home the message that deadbeats now
populate the bankruptcy courts." Id. at 21. For example, some creditors tried
to spread the message that bankruptcy is a "ten-year mistake" to remind
debtors that filing for bankruptcy protection will remain on their credit re-
port for ten years. Id. In addition to the credit industry suggesting that bank-
rupt debtors are, essentially, morally as well as financially bankrupt, many
government officials have referred to bankrupt debtors as "cheaters and char-
latans." Id. at 22. Even the sympathetic stories of troubled families who file for
bankruptcy may have increased the stigma associated with filing for consumer
bankruptcy protection because such stories may make other families with less
sympathetic stories, but equal need for bankruptcy protection, feel as though
they are undeserving of such protection because there are "people with bigger
problems." Id.
128. See Zywicki, supra note 6, at 1100-02.
129. See id. at 11oo-oi.
130. Id. at i1ol.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 1100-02.
133. The argument that migration increases filing rates may need to be more fully
reconciled with the notion that bankruptcy is primarily a middle class phe-
nomenon. The degree to which the middle class, particularly middle class
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Another factor that may have contributed to a decline in the stigma as-
sociated with bankruptcy is the trend of the media to portray bankrupt
debtors in a more sympathetic, and thus more favorable, light.'34 Professor
Rafael Efrat analyzed almost two hundred newspaper articles spanning a
period of almost one hundred and fifty years to ascertain the public percep-
tion of bankruptcy petitioners.'35 Efrat theorized that "embedded within
newspaper articles on consumer bankruptcy are important messages about
the appropriateness of filing for bankruptcy" and that "[w]hile messages
embedded in newspaper articles influence public opinion, [they] also reflect
existing public opinion."136 According to Efrat's study, the decrease in the
social stigma associated with bankruptcy can be seen as the media gradually
shifted away from portraying bankrupt debtors as "evil doers, cheaters,
crooks, fools, or perjurers" and instead described them as "hard working,
poor, struggling, and needy."'3 Efrat found that the more recent newspaper
articles contained "pictures of the poor, the disabled, the petitioner holding
a baby, the unsophisticated blue-collar worker, along with the white-collar
worker."' 38
Newspaper articles also began portraying the bankruptcy system in a
more favorable light. 3 9 For example, articles referred to the bankruptcy
system as "a system of 'legal protection,' as the 'federal fresh start program,'
as a wise financial strategy, or as an informal and easy process for dealing
with temporary setbacks."' 40
Bankruptcy attorneys provide another possible source for the decrease
in the social stigma associated with bankruptcy. 14 ' Debtors' attorneys are
households encountering a significant negative economic event, are migra-
tory; what it means to migrate; and the extent to which the migration must
take place before stigma lessens are all issues that may need to be more fully
developed.
134. See Zywicki, supra note 6, at 1102-03 (discussing Professor Rafael Efrat's con-
clusion that the media's more compassionate portrayal of bankrupt debtors
over time contributed to a decrease in the social stigma associated with bank-
ruptcy). See generally Rafael Efrat, Personal Bankruptcy in the 21st Century:
Emerging Trends and New Challenges, 7 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 365
(2006).
135. Efrat, supra note 134, at 385.
136. Id. at 385-86.
137. Id. at 389.
138. Id. at 390.
139. Id. at 391-92.
140. Id.
141. Zywicki, supra note 6, at 1107-o8.
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generally more hostile toward creditors than the debtors themselves.'42
These attorneys often dismiss the claim that debtors have a moral obligation
to repay creditors, and they use various tactics to instill this view in their
clients. 43 Some debtors' attorneys place the blame on third parties, such as
credit card companies that charge exorbitant interest rates. 144 Others try to
convince debtors that their moral obligations to their families, especially
their children, outweigh their moral obligations to repay creditors.' 45 By
repeatedly making these claims, it seems plausible that debtors' attorneys
have contributed to the decline in the social stigma associated with bank-
ruptcy.
The enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code may have also "played a
role in altering social norms regarding personal bankruptcy in the United
States,"'46 as certain provisions of the 1978 Code implicitly endorsed the
notion that bankrupt debtors were undeserving of scorn. 147 For example, the
1978 Code protected debtors from discrimination based on prior bank-
ruptcy filings: "The Code expanded the nondiscrimination provision of
[section] 525 to prohibit many forms of private discrimination and virtually
all forms of public discrimination against bankruptcy debtors."' 48 Further-
more, the Code incorporated semantic changes that "strip[ped] bankruptcy
of moral and emotional baggage that had previously interfered with a
straight financial calculation." 149 For example, the Code replaced the nega-
tively-perceived term "bankrupt" with the more neutral term "debtor."5 °
Similarly, the 1978 Code referred to a bankruptcy filing in bland, generic
terms, calling it an "order for relief."' 5' That language seems to imply that
the process of filing for bankruptcy is protective of debtors in serious need
of financial assistance from the federal government.
The 1978 Code also helped decrease the social stigma associated with
bankruptcy by "minimizing the pain associated with the bankruptcy process
142. Id. at 1107.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 1107-o8.
146. See Efrat, supra note 65, at 496; see also Zywicki, supra note 6, at 11o8.
147. See Efrat, supra note 65, at 496-97; Zywicki, supra note 6, at iio8.
148. Zywicki, supra note 6, at 11o8; see also S. REP. No. 95-989, at 81 (1978) (indicat-
ing that section 525 is intended to offer "additional debtor protection" against
discrimination); Efrat, supra note 65, at 497.
149. Zywicki, supra note 6, at iio8; see also Efrat, supra note 65, at 497-98.
150. Efrat, supra note 65, at 498; Zywicki, supra note 6, at 11o8.
151. Zywicki, supra note 6, at 11o8.
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and limiting public confrontation of petitioners." 5 2 With the enactment of
the 1978 Code, bankruptcy petitioners faced limited public exposure, and
the process of filing for bankruptcy took only a short amount of time.'53
Finally, that the rate of consumer bankruptcy filings was on the rise was
itself likely a factor in reducing the stigma associated with bankruptcy: "The
recognition that others have filed bankruptcy and have survived-in many
cases prospered-makes bankruptcy more routine in society, reducing the
stigma associated with it."1 4 Not only has the high number of "ordinary"
individuals filing for consumer bankruptcy likely contributed to the percep-
tion that "bankruptcy is a common and routine process," but the "problem
of enforcing traditional social norms may also [have been] made more diffi-
cult" since recently there have been quite a few high-profile celebrities who
have filed for bankruptcy. 55 Celebrities especially have the ability to influ-
ence social norms;'56 therefore, "[b]y highly publicizing leading figures and
well-known celebrities' bankruptcy filings, the media may have shaped pub-
lic perception on the subject making the traditional bankruptcy stigma less
pronounced."157
c. Increased Use of General Unsecured Credit
A third possible explanation for the dramatic increase in consumer
bankruptcy filings is "a change in the nature of consumer credit and in con-
sumer credit relations."58 In recent years, Americans have generally become
dependent on unsecured credit, particularly on credit cards, to finance the
necessities, the luxuries, and sometimes the unexpected surprises of life.5 9
As general unsecured credit has become many debtors' primary source of
credit, the benefits of Chapter 7 bankruptcy have increased, because Chapter
7 bankruptcy allows these debtors to discharge a majority, if not all, of their
obligations in bankruptcy: "[A]s debtors make greater use of unsecured
credit relative to secured and informal credit, the value of the bankruptcy
discharge will also increase. As the value of the bankruptcy discharge in-
creases, debtors will have a greater incentive to file bankruptcy." 160
152. Efrat, supra note 65, at 499.
153. See id. at 499 & n.107; see also Zywicki, supra note 6, at 11o9-1o.
154. Zywicki, supra note 6, at io9; see also Efrat, supra note 65, at 501-02.
155. Efrat, supra note 65, at 501-02.
156. See Zywicki, supra note 6, at 1lo9; Efrat, supra note 65, at 502.
157. Efrat, supra note 65, at 502.
158. Zywicki, supra note 6, at 111o; see id. at 1110-21.
159. See Zywicki, supra note 33, at iiii.
160. Id.; see also id. at 1114 ("[T]he recent shift by consumers toward unsecured
debt, primarily as the result of greater use of credit cards, would tend to in-
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In particular, the trend of debtors seeking unsecured credit in the form
of credit cards as a replacement for informal credit (from, for example, fam-
ily members) may have also contributed to the increase in bankruptcy fil-
ings by "mak[ing] consumer credit relations less 'personal' in nature." 161
That is, as credit relations have become more impersonal, more debtors are
more willing to file for bankruptcy for three primary reasons: 162 First, the
impersonal nature of a transaction with a credit card company may lessen
the degree to which a debtor feels a moral obligation to repay the debt.
163
Second, impersonal credit relationships undermine the extralegal con-
straints that arise when debtors have repeated dealings with their credi-
tors."6 Historically, there were few opportunities for an individual to obtain
credit. 65 Thus, when a debtor entered into a relationship with a creditor,
the debtor had an incentive to repay the obligation so that the debtor would
have the opportunity to borrow from the trusting creditor again in the fu-
ture. 1
66
Furthermore, in small, close-knit communities, the risk of earning a
reputation as an untrustworthy individual who did not repay debts pro-
vided a strong disincentive for debotrs to default. 67 Today, however, gen-
eral, unsecured credit is readily available 16 and "post-bankruptcy debtors
will find a relatively vibrant and competitive market for borrowing."' 69 As a
result, debtors may feel less constrained by the need to establish a positive
reputation through repeat dealings with their creditors. Debtors are, there-
fore, more free to file bankruptcy.
Third, the use of general unsecured credit has reduced the need of debt-
ors to maintain solid reputations as trustworthy individuals who repay their
obligations. 7° As previously noted, many bankruptcy petitioners are able to
crease bankruptcy filing rates by increasing the percentage of debt that is dis-
chargeable in bankruptcy.").
161. See id. at 1115-21.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 1116-19.
164. See id. at 1116, 1119-20.
165. Id. at 1119.
166. See id. at 1119-20.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 112o; see also id. at 1095-96 (noting that, according to a recent survey,
"three-quarters of bankruptcy filers have at least one credit card within a year
after filing").
169. Id. at 1120.
170. See id. at 1116, 1120-21.
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obtain credit only shortly after filing for bankruptcy.17' In fact, "a debtor
who files bankruptcy and receives a discharge may be a relatively better
credit risk than prior to filing bankruptcy, because she cannot receive an-
other discharge for [eight] years." ' Thus, even knowing that a debtor has
not been willing or able to satisfy previous loan obligations, creditors are
still willing to lend to them, arguably making debtors' decisions to file for
bankruptcy much easier.
2. Forces Beyond a Debtor's Control
On the other side of the debate, opponents of bankruptcy reform tend
to have a more sympathetic view of debtors who file for consumer bank-
ruptcy protection. While opponents of bankruptcy reform acknowledge that
there will always be some debtors who abuse the system by filing for bank-
ruptcy when they have the ability to repay their obligations, 73 opponents of
bankruptcy reform believe that most debtors seek bankruptcy protection as
a last-resort solution to a financial crisis beyond their control. 174 On this
view, typical debtors are "exhausted emotionally and financially" and turn
to bankruptcy "hoping that the opportunity to discharge some debts and
restructure others will help to stop the collection calls, save their homes or
their cars from foreclosure and repossession, and give them the chance to
stabilize their economic circumstances."7 7 Thus, opponents of bankruptcy
reform attribute the increase in the number of consumer bankruptcy filings
to a rise in both the number and the frequency of unexpected-and some-
times tragic-events that impact debtors' income and expenses.
Indeed, studies show that a substantial number of debtors file for bank-
ruptcy after experiencing an employment-related problem. 176 In an alarm-
ing 2001 study conducted by Professors Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook,
more than two-thirds of those filing for consumer bankruptcy had experi-
enced a job-related problem prior to filing. 77 These job-related problems
ranged from the loss of a job to partial unemployment, such as a decrease in
the number of hours worked or a job transfer in which the transferred em-
171. See supra note 168 and accompanying text; see also Zywicki, supra note 6, at
1121.
172. Zywicki, supra note 6, at 1121; see ii U.S.C. § 727(a)(8) (West 2004 & Supp.
2007).
173. See Jacoby et al., supra note 69, at 376.
174. Id.; see also supra notes 68-71, 74 and accompanying text.
175. Jacoby et al., supra note 69, at 376.
176. See Warren, supra note 33, at 126-27.
177. Id. at 127.
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
ployee's spouse failed to find work in the new location.17 1 Whatever the
reason for experiencing an interruption in income, more than one-third of
the debtors in the 2001 study specifically identified a job-related problem-
sometimes as a factor that contributed to the debtor's need for bankruptcy
protection and sometimes as the exact problem that "pushed them into
bankruptcy."' 79 Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook found, therefore, that
"[n] o single problem is more likely to be associated with a bankruptcy filing
than an income interruption." "0
Apart from job-related issues, many debtors cannot afford to pay
health-related costs and need consumer bankruptcy as a "[health] insurer of
last resort."' 8 According to a 1999 study conducted by Professor Melissa B.
Jacoby and Professors Sullivan and Warren, more than half a million fami-
lies in one year were forced to seek consumer bankruptcy protection after
experiencing some type of illness or injury.82 That is, more than half of all
of the consumer bankruptcy filings in 1999 involved some type of medical-
related problem.'83 This number is not shocking; rather, it is well known
that for at least the past four decades, medical expenses have caused or con-
tributed to numerous consumer bankruptcies.'
It should be noted, moreover, that the study found that the burden of
medical expenses was not allocated solely to those who lacked medical in-
surance. Of the debtors who identified a medical problem as causing or
contributing to their need for bankruptcy protection, about half were in-
sured and about half were uninsured. 8 ' This indicates that an unexpected
medical-related expense could force any member of our society into bank-
ruptcy, even those who have health insurance.'86 Thus, when a debtor turns
to the bankruptcy courts after experiencing an expensive illness or injury,8 7
it seems difficult to place the blame on the debtor.
178. See id. at 126.
179. See id. at 126-27.
180. Id. at 127.
181. See Jacoby et al., supra note 69, at 410.
182. See id. at 375.
183. Id. at 377.
184. See id. at 378-82.
185. See id. at 400.
186. While beyond the scope of this paper, this reasoning supports the notion that
bankruptcy is serving as a risk spreading function much like conventional in-
surance does. To the extent bankruptcy is serving as a stop-gap in our health-
care system in the absence of universal coverage, important health care public
policy issues are implicated.
187. See Jacoby et al., supra note 69, at 410.
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Families with children face an even greater financial burden when an
unexpected setback occurs.' 8 Children bring with them numerous expenses
without providing any income to offset these expenses.8 9 Compared to
childless familes, families with children must divide the wage-earners' in-
come among more people. 9 In addition to the typical expenses associated
with caring for children-food, clothing, day care, etc.-children also bring
a higher likelihood of unexpected expenses like medical bills. 9 ' Further-
more, families that have children may not be able to recover from a finan-
cial crisis should one arise: 92
Job losses, medical problems, and divorces happen to people
with children and to people with no children, but adults' responses
to these problems may be different in families with children than in
those without. Families with children may be much slower to cut
expenses, thereby making themselves more vulnerable than families
with no children. If so, this would be another plausible explanation
for the high proportion of families with children in bankruptcy.
... [T]he configuration of expenses for families may make it
more difficult for them to adjust to economic reversals, and that
difficulty may be reflected in higher bankruptcy filing rates.
It may also be harder for families with children to cut back on
expenses for deeply held psychological reasons. To face economic
reversals for oneself may be much easier than imposing those rever-
sals on someone, especially on a much-loved child.'93
Finally, children often impair the ability of even "responsible" income-
earners to earn money. 94 With the time restrictions imposed by day care
centers, parents have less flexibility with their work schedules. 95 They do
not always have the ability to work late, to work overtime, or to travel, and
188. See generally Warren, supra note 70 (discussing the unique expenses and fi-
nancial considerations associated with having, raising, and providing for chil-
dren and concluding that "our economic structures are putting middle-class
families rearing children at a disproportionate economic risk").
189. See id. at 1OO6.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 1013, 1022.
192. Id. at 1022-24; see also id. at 1021 ("Once an individual commits to a home
mortgage, car loan, or school tuition, the bills keep rolling in-even if mom
loses her job or dad has a heart attack.").
193. Id. at 1023 (internal footnotes omitted).
194. See id. at 1OO6, 1021-23.
195. Id. at 1021-22.
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in the end, this may decrease their chances of earning a promotion and in-
creasing their salary.'96 Thus, children put families at great financial risk,'97
and it should not be surprising that families with children are much more
likely to file for bankruptcy than those without children.19 8 And, as the
number of children in a family increases, so do the chances of a family need-
ing help from the consumer bankruptcy system.
99
In sum, unexpected job-related or medical problems are two examples
of the forces beyond one's control that impact the income or expenses of
many debtors. There are other examples as well,"' including caring for eld-
erly family members, 20 ' divorce, 22 the death of an income-earning family
member, and the collapse of a small business.20 3 As noted above, abuse by
debtors04 and debtor irresponsibility25 also cause consumer bankruptcy
rates to rise. But the question is whether these explanations account suffi-
ciently for the dramatic rise in consumer bankruptcy rates over the past
three decades. When the data show that many debtors have been led to
bankruptcy by economic crises and personal tragedies beyond their control,
it is plausible that more and more debtors are filing for consumer bank-
ruptcy because they are truly in need.
II. CONGRESSIONAL STATEMENTS REGARDING THE BANKRUPTCY
AMENDMENTS
There is no conclusive evidence indicating the precise cause of the dra-
matic increase in consumer bankruptcy filings over the past three dec-
ades.206 Are a significant number of debtors substantially abusing the con-
sumer bankruptcy system by reaping its benefits (namely, a complete dis-
196. See id.
197. See id. at l18-24.
198. See id. at 1012-20. In fact, "[tlhe presence of children in a household-with
nothing more-increases the likelihood that the household will be in bank-
ruptcy by three-fold (302%)." Id. at 1013.
199. See id. at 1019-20.
200. See generally TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE
WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT (2000).
201. See Warren, supra note 70, at oo6; Warren, supra note 43.
202. See Warren, supra note 33, at 145; Warren, supra note 43.
203. See Sullivan et al., supra note 36, at 6, 8; Warren, supra note 33, at 125-27.
204. See Jacoby et al., supra note 69, at 376.
205. See Warren, supra note 33, at 145 (noting that a cause of the increased number
of consumer bankruptcy filings may be debtors' inability to handle credit).
206. See supra Part I.
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charge of most unsecured debt) even though they have the ability to repay
some, if not all, of their obligations? Or are a majority of debtors turning to
the bankruptcy courts as a last resort after experiencing some type of devas-
tating financial crisis beyond their control? In other words, the question is
which best explains the growing consumer bankruptcy trend, the Substan-
tial Abuse Theory, promoted by Professor Zywicki, or the Forces Beyond
Debtors' Control Theory, advocated by Professors Sullivan, Warren, and
Westbrook.
On this question Congress has sided with the Substantial Abuse Theory:
According to Congress, the dramatic increase in consumer bankruptcy fil-
ings is more likely caused by debtors substantially abusing the consumer
bankruptcy system. °7 Congress enacted BAPCPA in 2005211 in a deliberate
effort to amend the Bankruptcy Code to prevent consumer debtors from
continuing to abuse the bankruptcy system. Under BAPCPA, a consumer
debtor is ineligible for a Chapter 7 discharge and thus must formulate a
Chapter 13 repayment plan if (1) the debtor's annual income exceeds the
state median income for families of the same size;209 (2) after subtracting out
certain allowed expenses, the debtor has sufficient income remaining to
repay a substantial portion of the debtor's obligations; 210 and (3) the debtor
does not have any "special circumstances, such as a serious medical condi-
207. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S1825 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Ses-
sions) ("[BAPCPA] is designed to analyze what is occurring in Federal bank-
ruptcy courts every day .... [Olver the years, people have learned to manipu-
late this system."); id. at S1843 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (" [O] ur lax policing
of those who attempt a [C]hapter 7 filing actually encourages additional
bankruptcies.... From now on, those who are capable of financial reorgani-
zation, rather than outright liquidation, will have to keep their promises or at
lease some of their promises."); id. at S1842 (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("The
essence of [BAPCPA] is simple. This legislation is designed to make our bank-
ruptcy system more fair and efficient. As well, this bill would cut down on the
ability to abuse the current system."); id. at S1821 (statement of Sen. Sessions)
("When a person in America undertakes an obligation to pay someone, they
ought to pay them .... We are drifting a bit to suggest there is no real obliga-
tion to pay the debts we incur. If we get to that point, then we have eroded
some very important fundamental moral principles.., in America."); see also
Press Release, The White House, President Signs Bankruptcy Abuse Preven-
tion, Consumer Protection Act (Apr. 20, 2005),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/o4/2005o42o-5.html# (state-
ment of President George W. Bush) ("In recent years, too many people have
abused the bankruptcy laws.").
208. Pub. L. No. lO9-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
209. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 70 7 (b)( 7)(A) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
210. See id. § 707(b)(2)(A).
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tion or a call or order to active duty... [,] that justify additional expenses or
adjustments of current monthly income." 211
These conditions, which make up the so-called means test, are one of
BAPCPA's most substantial and controversial changes to the Bankruptcy
Code. 12 The means test is designed to force those debtors who have the
ability to repay at least some of their debts into a Chapter 13 repayment
plan.2 13 This allows the debtor's creditors, particularly unsecured creditors
like credit card companies, to recover more money than they would have if
the debtor had received a discharge under Chapter 7.214
Congress justified the means test in part by noting that the provision
would impact only io% of all consumers. According to Senator Hatch,
"[O]nly lo percent of bankruptcy filers will ever be moved into [Chapter 13]
repayment plans.... [1It is [not] too much to ask that these relatively high-
income debtors, who can afford to pay their debts, pay back some of what
they owe."21' In other words, to address potential abuse by io% of all debt-
ors, Congress approved amendments to the Bankruptcy Code that subjected
all debtors to the means test, including the overwhelming majority of bank-
211. See id. § 7o7(b)(2)(B)(i).
212. See 151 CONG. REC. H2o55 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2005) (statement of Professor
Elizabeth Warren).
213. See, e.g., id. at S1842 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("A key
component of [BAPCPA] is a means test .... All [the means test] does is
identify those who can repay at least some of their debts. It makes certain they
enter into a [C]hapter 13 reorganization and repayment plan rather than let
them simply walk away from their obligations ... ."); id. at S1836 (statement
of Sen. Kennedy) (noting that the means test is "at the heart of" the 2005
Bankruptcy Amendments); see also Press Release, The White House, President
Signs Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention, Consumer Protection Act (Apr. 20,
2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/04/20050420-5.html#
(statement of President George W. Bush) ("Under the [BAPCPA], Americans
who have the ability to pay will be required to pay back at least a portion of
their debts."). See generally Jones & Zywicki, supra note 18, at 199.
214. See 151 CONG. REC. S1843 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch)
("There is something inherently unfair in denying full restitution to credi-
tors."); see also id. at S1842 (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("The problem... is...
about io percent of... [C]hapter 7 filings are fraudulent.... This represents
$3 billion in costs that can be recovered.").
215. Id. at S1843 (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also id. at S182o (statement of Sen.
Sessions) ("[Only] lo percent of... filers ... will be impacted.... [S]ome of
those are the biggest offenders. Some of those are the people with the highest
income. As a matter of fact, all of them will be people with incomes above the
median income. They ought to pay some of their debts back. [BAPCPA] will
say they must do that.").
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rupt debtors (i.e., the other 90%) who "[did not] have two nickels to rub
together."2 6 Thus, Congress seemed to embrace the idea that all debtors
should be subject to scrutiny for cheating,2"7 even though at most only io%
of consumer debtors abuse the bankruptcy system. 2I" The means test is
meant to treat all debtors alike,219 even though it is the "American spirit"22
216. Id. at S1823 (statement of Sen. Durbin).
217. See id. ("The bill we are considering assumes that the majority of people are
out to cheat the system. Despite the fact that even the credit card industry says
90 percent of the people are not, this bill assumes they are.").
218. This assumes that failing the means test automatically means that the failing
debtor is in fact abusing the consumer bankruptcy system.
219. Professor Elizabeth Warren explained to Congress that the means test is prob-
lematic because it treats all consumer debtors alike:
[T]he means test ... has ... [a] basic problem: It treats all families
alike. It assumes that everyone is in bankruptcy for the same rea-
son-too much unnecessary spending. A family driven to bank-
ruptcy by the increased costs of caring for an elderly parent with
Alzheimer's disease is treated the same as someone who maxed out
his credit cards at a casino. A person who had a heart attack is
treated the same as someone who had a spending spree at the shop-
ping mall. A mother who works two jobs and who cannot manage
the prescription drugs needed for a child with diabetes is treated the
same as someone who charged a bunch of credit cards with only a
vague intent to repay. A person cheated by a sub-prime mortgage
lender and lied to by a credit counseling agency is treated the same as
a person who gamed the system in every possible way.
151 CONG. REC. H2O55 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2005) (statement of Professor Eliza-
beth Warren); see also id. at S1818 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Durbin) ("Sadly, [BAPCPA] makes no distinction between the irresponsi-
ble.., and those who have done everything humanly possible and end up in
debt.").
220. Senator Edward M. Kennedy, the United States Senator from Massachusetts,
identified this American priority:
[W]hen life throws you an unexpected setback, you can count on
your neighbors to pitch in. If you lose your job or you fall seriously
ill, we all want to help out. You should be given a second chance to
pick yourself up, dust yourself off, work hard, and reclaim the
American dream for you and your family. That is the American way.
That is the American spirit. That is what our bankruptcy courts
should be about: giving average Americans who have lived responsi-
bly a second chance.
Id. at S2326 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); see also id. at
S1838 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) ("[W] hen financial disaster strikes a fam-
ily-when a business collapses, when medical bills pile up, when a reservist is
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to help the responsible but unfortunate. That is, Congress declined to dis-
tinguish between the irresponsible and the unfortunate debtor, rejecting, for
example, Amendment Number 28, which would have exempted from the
means test those debtors "whose financial problems were caused by serious
medical problems."22" '
In addition, BAPCPA imposes burdens on consumer debtors that may
prevent them from obtaining financial relief under our consumer protec-
tion system.222 Senator Durbin, for instance, provided an example of how a
debtor struggling to pay bills (e.g., unexpected medical expenses) might be
adversely affected by BAPCPA's means test:
Imagine you have this huge medical debt hanging over your
head. The creditors are not only calling you at home, they are call-
ing your kids at home. The kids are crying, saying: How many more
phone calls do we have to take, Mom?
You get to go to bankruptcy court, but you just discovered
something. You don't have enough money on hand. You have
barely enough to get from paycheck to paycheck, and the attorney
says: I will represent you, but there is a $209 filing fee to go into
bankruptcy court, and I am going to need at least $500 to start this
proceeding as your attorney.
What am I going to do? I have a credit card. I am going to go
ahead and take cash out of my credit card to pay the filing fee and to
get $5oo for the lawyer so I can go to court.
If I do that within 70 days of filing bankruptcy, they declare this
as a fraudulent transaction that cannot be discharged in bank-
ruptcy. That credit card debt for [$750] -plus within 70 days of filing
is with me forever. The credit card company has me forever until I
pay it off.223
BAPCPA requires a Chapter 7 petitioner to produce paperwork, includ-
ing a copy of pay stubs or other evidence of payments received, for the sixty
days prior to filing for bankruptcy. 224 It also requires a copy of a tax return
called up for extended active duty, when workers lose their jobs because of a
plant closing or outsourcing - the economic catastrophes can be hidden from
view. That is where our bankruptcy laws come in .... It is the American spirit
to help these families through financial disasters.").
221. Id. at S18 95.Amendment Number 28 was rejected by a vote of 39 to 58. Id. at
S19 24 .
222. For a list of debtors' duties, see ii U.S.C.A. § 521 (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
223. See 151 CONG. REC. S1822 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Durbin)
(referencing 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2)(C)(i)(II) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007)).
224. 11 U.S.C.A. § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
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for the most recent year prior to filing.225 BAPCPA further provides that
bankrupt debtors must receive credit counseling prior to receiving bank-
ruptcy relief.226 If debtors do not comply with these provisions, their peti-
tions may be denied227 and they may be prevented from receiving the relief
that they need. Responsible-but-unfortunate debtors-according to Senator
Hatch, the 9o% of Americans that would qualify for Chapter 7 protection
even under BAPCPA's means test-stand to loose the most under this sys-
tem.
To ensure compliance with BAPCPA's requirements, debtors may em-
ploy a bankruptcy attorney (i.e., a "debt relief agency"228 ), but BAPCPA
holds such attorneys personally liable for any errors they make.2 29 Though
some members of Congress worried that burdens such as these would im-
pede the ability of debtors to obtain consumer bankruptcy protection,23 °
Congress nevertheless enacted BAPCPA in an effort "to restore integrity to
the bankruptcy process."
231
Indeed, Congress in part enacted BAPCPA to ensure that Americans-
broadly construed--did not have to pay for the debts of those debtors who
could afford to repay at least some of their obligations (i.e., debtors who
abuse the consumer bankruptcy system).232 Still, there is a possibility of
substantial abuse that BAPCPA does not address.233
225. Id. § 521(e)(2)(A).
226. Id. § 521(b)(1).
227. See id. § 521(e)(2)(b), 5 21(i)(1).
228. Id. § 101(12) (A).
229. See id. §§ 526(a)(2), 7 o7(b)(4)(D).
230. See 151 CONG. REC. S1836 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)
("In short, [BAPCPA] does everything the mind of the purveyors of predatory
plastic could think up to make their cardholders pay in full, and prevent them
from getting the 'fresh start' that bankruptcy offers them. Its purpose is to
keep the credit card payments rolling in, and prevent that money from being
used to feed their children or pay their hospital bills or make their mortgage
payments. It labels them as abusers of the system.").
231. See Press Release, The White House, President Signs Bankruptcy Abuse Pre-
vention, Consumer Protection Act (Apr. 20, 2005),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/o4/2005o42o-5.html# (state-
ment of President George W. Bush).
232. See 151 CONG. REC. S1842 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch)
("The problem.., is... about lo percent of... [C]hapter 7 filings are
fraudulent.... This represents $3 billion in costs that can be recovered rather
than being passed along to consumers. You and I and everybody else pay for
these abuses of the system."); id. at S18 44 (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("When
some people game the system to walk away from debts that they are perfectly
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The bankruptcy amendments do not deal with abuses of the commer-
cial bankruptcy system (i.e., Chapter ii) by so-called "corporate bankrupt
cheaters." In the words of Senator Durbin:
In the last few years, America has seen this parade of corporate
bankruptcy .... In some cases, the CEOs, many of whom are on
trial, and their top officers were paid multimillion-dollar bonuses
even as the companies were being run into the ground. Then the
companies filed for [C]hapter ii bankruptcy protection and asked a
judge to throw out worker contracts and cancel pension plans and
health benefits, leaving thousands of families devastated.
Wouldn't one think in a bankruptcy bill we would go after
some of these corporate bankrupt cheaters?... Wouldn't that be
fair, and wouldn't it be timely. It would. You will not find one word
about it in [the bankruptcy amendments] ....
Boy, sounds like the subject of a bill which Congress might one
day consider, but, no, it will not be today. We do not talk about
those people. We are talking about the woman who went in diag-
nosed with breast cancer, who did not have health insurance and
ended up with tens of thousands of dollars of medical bills and
found out she could not pay for them and in desperation filed for
bankruptcy. We are going after her."'
able to repay, an injustice occurs that has ramifications for our entire econ-
omy. And guess who has to pay for their dishonesty. You and I and everybody
else because we pay an average of $40o a year for this bankruptcy system....
The cost of bankruptcy to taxpayers: s44 billion in debt discharged per year,
or $11o million every day, a $400 yearly bankruptcy tax on every household in
the country.").
233. Significantly, the substantial abuse of the consumer bankruptcy system by
dishonest debtors (i.e., those who obtain a Chapter 7 discharge even though
they can presumably repay at least some of their obligations) costs each
American household less than $30 per year. As indicated by Senator Orrin
Hatch, only $3 billion of the s44 billion that is discharged annually in bank-
ruptcy is due to fraudulent filings. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
In other words, less than 7% of the amount discharged annually in bank-
ruptcy is due to "fraudulent" filings. Thus, if the bankruptcy system costs
each American household $400 per year, less than 7% of that amount (i.e.,
less than $28 per household per year) pays for fraudulent filings.
234. 151 CONG. REC. S1819 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Durbin); see
also id. at H2o54 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2005) (testimony of Professor Elizabeth
Warren); id. at S1822 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Durbin)
("This bill is all about the bankruptcies of ordinary Americans, ordinary
Americans who are seeing their jobs outsourced, ordinary Americans who are
seeing their health insurance downsized if they are lucky enough to have it,
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Furthermore, even though BAPCPA made it more difficult for con-
sumer debtors to protect assets through homestead exemptions,235 the po-
tential for abuse of homestead provisions remains. As Senator Kennedy
stated: "[BAPCPA] ... fails to deal effectively with the unlimited homestead
exemptions in a few States which allow the rich to hold on to their multi-
million-dollar mansions while middle-class families in other States lose their
modest homes."23 6 Even though some supporters of BAPCPA in Congress
downsized every year, ordinary Americans who have seen their real wages de-
cline, ordinary Americans who are not even being paid a minimum wage that
reflects the cost of getting by in America, ordinary workers who are losing
overtime pay because this administration is restricting the rules for eligibility
on overtime. These are the people we are after. We are not after those corpo-
rate CEOs. We will save them for another day. Right. Don't hold your
breath."); id. at S1923 (statement of Sen. Kennedy). In sum, members of Con-
gress who opposed BAPCPA were upset at how the bankruptcy amendments
forced consumer debtors, even those who incurred substantial medical bills
through no fault of their own, to honor their obligations; yet, BAPCPA does
not hold corporate CEOs to the same standard:
Corporate CEOs can force their companies into bankruptcy and
enrich themselves, but they are not held accountable. This bill ig-
nores their irresponsible actions. But an average American facing
cancer can lose everything under this bill: their home, their savings,
their hopes, their dreams.
They get no second chance.
Id. at S19 23 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (discussing Amendments Number 28
and Number 29, which would have provided an exemption from the means
test and an increased homestead exemption for consumer debtors who ex-
perienced serious medical problems).
235. Under BAPCPA, a debtor must actually live in a house in the state for two
years in order to take advantage of that state's homestead exemption. See 11
U.S.C.A. § 522(b)(3)(A) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007). According to proponents
of BAPCPA, this provision, though not perfect, will prevent bankrupt debtors
from "buying a house on the eve of filing bankruptcy" in order to protect as-
sets that would otherwise be used to repay creditors. 151 CONG. REC. S182o
(daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Sessions).
236. 151 CONG. REC. S2321 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); see
also id. at S1822 (statement of Sen. Durbin) ("Here you are with a multimil-
lion-dollar home and these debts and you do not pay your debts, and the
States of Florida, Texas, Kansas, and a few others say whatever you home is
worth, it is exempt. It is a loophole in the law. If we are talking about just and
right conduct in this situation, then clearly we would change the homestead
law."); id. at S19o6 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Durbin) (pro-
viding the example of Illinois resident Joyce Owens, who would not be able to
keep her home if she sought consumer bankruptcy protection to discharge the
$200,000 of medical-bill debt that she incurred as a result of caring for her
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recognized that homestead exemptions can be abused and the discrepancies
between state homestead exemptions may be unfair,237 they nevertheless
voted for BAPCPA because "perfect is not always achievable. ' 23 In fact,
Congress specifically rejected Amendment Number 68, which would have
"limit[ed] the homestead exemption nationwide to $300,000. "239
Another criticism of BAPCPA is that it does not adequately address
questionable lending practices such as extending credit to the elderly, 240
quadriplegic son); id. at S1892 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Fein-
gold) (explaining how the homestead exemption varies from state to state and
how the homestead exemption in too many states is "woefully inadequate").
In some states, such as Florida, Kansas, and Texas, the homestead exemption
is not restricted to a certain amount. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a)(1); KAN.
CONST. art. XV, § 9; TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50. Therefore, bankrupt debtors
in these states can keep their home, regardless of its value and regardless of
how much they owe to creditors. See 151 CONG. REC. S1819 (daily ed. Mar. 1,
2005) (statement of Sen. Durbin) (explaining how the former commissioner
of Major League Baseball, Bowie Kuhn, "took advantage" of Florida's home-
stead exemption by purchasing a multimillion dollar home "with every penny
he owned" prior to filing bankruptcy "[s]o everything he ever had in life was
protected"); see also id. at S183o (statement of Sen. Durbin); id. at S19o7
(statement of Sen. Durbin).
237. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S1820 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (Statement of Sen. Ses-
sions) ("Are there additional abuses we would like to deal with, one in par-
ticular... ,the homestead exemption? I would like to have gone further.").
238. Id. Senator Sessions added: "It is in the constitution of quite a number of
States that homesteading is so much and Senators have dug in their heels and
said this overrides the Florida constitution, the Kansas Constitution, the
Texas constitution, or I cannot agree to do that on the floor, I will fight
[BAPCPA] and object to it if anyone tries to do that." Id.; see also id. at S1893
(statement of Sen. Hatch) (asserting that choices regarding homestead provi-
sions belong to the states and not the federal government).
239. Id. at S2325 (statement of Sen. Kennedy). Amendment Number 68 was re-
jected by a vote of 47 to 53. Id. at S2326. It should also be noted that Congress
rejected Amendment Number 17, which would have imposed a "uniform
Federal floor for homestead exemptions of $75,ooo, applicable.., to bank-
ruptcy debtors over the age of 62." Id. at S18 9 2 (statement of Sen. Feingold).
Amendment Number 17 was rejected by a vote of 40 to 59. Id. at S1894. Addi-
tionally, Congress rejected Amendment Number 29, which said that "if one
has severe medical problems that are going to drive one into bankruptcy,
[one] will be able to have a protection for up to si5o,ooo in home equity." Id.
at S1924 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (discussing Amendment Number 29).
In other words, Amendment Number 29 would have provided protection for
homeowners who had "severe" medical debt. Amendment Number 29 was re-
jected by a vote of 39 to 58. Id. at S1924.
240. Id. at S1838 (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
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college students,241 the working poor,242 and infants.243 Credit card compa-
nies attract many unsuspecting consumers by highlighting minimum
monthly payments in bold type on advertisements and contracts and by
hiding the "exorbitant interest payments that inevitably result" in the "fine
print. '24 4 Congress rejected Amendment Number 15, which would have
required "enhanced disclosure to consumers regarding the consequences of
making only minimum required payments in the repayment of credit card
debt. '245 Congress further rejected Amendment Number 38, which would
have "discourage[d] predatory lending practices"2 46 such as "hidden and
excessive fees and interest rates; lending without regard to the borrower's
ability to pay; repeatedly refinancing a loan over a short period of time
without any economic gain, known as loan flipping; and committing out-
right fraud and deception, such as intentionally misleading borrowers about
the terms of the loan."
247
Thus, opponents of the bankruptcy amendments claimed that Congress
enacted BAPCPA primarily, or solely, to benefit credit card companies and
major financial institutions. As Senator Durbin remarked:
Who wants this bill [i.e., BAPCPA]? That is the most important
question to ask about any legislation that comes to the floor. The
people who want this bill are the credit card companies and major
financial institutions.
Why do they want it? Here is the circumstance. Imagine, if you
will, that you and your family are so deeply in debt that there is no
way out. It could be because of medical bills you did not anticipate.
It might be because somebody lost a job and could not find one. It
could be because of a divorce or some other extraordinary situa-
tion....
What is this bankruptcy reform bill about? The purpose of this
bill is to make certain for many people that if you go into court to
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at S1819 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Durbin) (noting that a
three-and-a-half-year-old boy and a nine-month-old girl received credit card
solicitations).
244. Id. at S1838 (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
245. Id. at S18 9 2 (describing the purpose of Amendment Number 15, which was
proposed by Senator Akaka, the United States Senator from Hawaii).
Amendment Number 15 was rejected by a vote of 40 to 59. Id. at S1894.
246. Id. at S1920 (describing the purpose of Amendment Number 38).
247. Id. at $1920 (statement of Sen. Durbin). Amendment Number 38 was rejected
by a vote of 40 to 58. Id. at S1984.
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file for bankruptcy, the slate will not be wiped clean. You will not
walk out of that bankruptcy court at the end of the day with no
debt. You will end up in a circumstance where you will carry many
of these debts to the grave. What kind of debts are we talking about?
Credit card debt, other debts that you have incurred that will stay
with you for a lifetime....
Naturally, the credit card industry and big banks want this bill.
They believe if they can hang on forever and will not be discharged
in bankruptcy, they will get something back in the process. They be-
lieve this bill will discourage people from filing bankruptcy, and
people will just labor under this debt they never paid off longer and
longer.248
III. PRIOR EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF BAPCPA
Although there is a wealth of empirical studies that focus on consumer
bankruptcies, only two studies have looked at information available after
BAPCPA became effective.249 This Section will briefly discuss these post-
248. Id. at S18i8 (statement of Sen. Durbin); see also id. at S1823 (statement of Sen.
Durbin) ("The credit card companies want this law so they can squeeze every
last dollar out of decent, hard-working, play-by-the-rules people who have al-
ready been devastated economically by traumatic events such as job loss, di-
vorce, and, increasingly, medical problems."); id. at S1923 (statement of Sen.
Kennedy) ("[T]his bill requires average citizens to pay and pay and pay and
pay, even when you do not have a dime to your name. And who is first in line
to get your money? The credit card companies. They do not care if you are
sick. They demand your money-with interest.").
249. See, e.g., Robert M. Lawless, Bankruptcy Filing Rates After a Major Hurricane,
6 NEV. L.J. 7 (2005) (determining that bankruptcy filings rise dramatically in
the twelve to thirty six months after a hurricane and arguing that BAPCPA
should be amended to be more lenient on those who are filing because they
are victims of a natural disaster); Jean M. Lown, Serial Bankruptcy: A 20-Year
Study of Utah Filers, 25-1 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2006, at 24 (examining
multiple filers in Utah from 1984 to 2004 to determine the extent of serial fil-
ings, estimate the extent of abuse by serial filers, establish a profile of debtors
apparently abusing the system, and develop a statistical model to compare po-
tential abusers to non-abusers); Stephen W. Sather, The Great Bankruptcy
Rush of 2005 and Its Aftermath: The View from Texas, 25-7 AM. BANKR. INST.
J., Sept. 20o6, at 34 (examining (i) bankruptcy filings in Texas prior to the en-
actment of BAPCPA, (2) filings after enactment but before BAPCPA's effec-
tive date, and (3) filings after the effective date and concluding (A) that the
change in the law was well known to the bar and the public, leading many
people to file before the effective date; (B) that the changes were perceived as
having a bigger impact on Chapter 7 and thus that the rise in Chapter 7 cases
was much higher than that of Chapter 13; and (C) that the rush to file proba-
bly involved some hysterical behavior with many people ultimately asking to
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BAPCPA studies. It will also examine pre-BAPCPA studies that discussed
the potential implications of BAPCPA for consumer bankruptcies based on
pre-BAPCPA data.
Professor Charles J. Tabb's study is "the first study that [took] into ac-
count the impact of BAPCPA, both in anticipation of and in the aftermath
of its effective date."2 ' In a two-part paper published in consecutive issues
of the American Bankruptcy Institute Journal, Tabb examined consumer
bankruptcy filing trends and indicators.25 ' Part I of his article looked at con-
sumer bankruptcy filing rates and sought to identify predictors for filing
rates. That is, Professor Tabb asked, "What causes consumer bank-
ruptcy?"252 Part 1I of Professor Tabb's article examined the correlation of
several economic indicators to the consumer bankruptcy filing rate.
2 53
In Part I, Professor Tabb examined statistical data on Chapter 7 and 13
filings both pre- and post-BAPCPA. He concluded that: (1) filing rates had
increased dramatically since the Bankruptcy Code went into effect, with the
bulk of the increase occurring 1985-1997, when filings quadrupled; (2) in
anticipation of BAPCPA's effective date, non-business filings, especially in
Chapter 7, had increased substantially; (3) after BAPCPA's effective date,
consumer filings had declined dramatically; (4) however, when findings (2)
and (3) were taken together, the total filings since BAPCPA's enactment
have their cases dismissed because they did not need to file in the first place);
Richard L. Wiener et al., Unwrapping Assumptions: Applying Social Analytic
Jurisprudence to Consumer Bankruptcy Education Requirements and Policy, 79
AM. BANKR. L.J. 453 (2005) (using statistical analysis in an attempt to show a
disconnect between people's behavior and the assumptions on which
BAPCPA was enacted).
250. Charles J. Tabb, Consumer Filings: Trends and Indicators (pt. 1), 25-9 AM.
BANKR. INST. J., Nov. 2006, at I, i [hereinafter Tabb I]; Charles J. Tabb, Con-
sumer Filings: Trends and Indicators (pt. 2), 25-1o AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec.
20o6-Jan. 2007, at 42, 42 [hereinafter Tabb II].
251. Tabb I, supra note 250, at I.
252. Id.
253. Tabb II, supra note 250, at 42. The economic indicators examined include:
1) total consumer credit outstanding; 2) revolving consumer credit;
3) non-revolving consumer credit; 4) revolving credit as a percentage
of total consumer credit; 5) personal, non-farm mortgage debt (or
'home' mortgages); 6) sum of total consumer credit and home mort-
gage debt; 7) ratio of total consumer credit to personal income; 8) ra-
tio of "total debt" (i.e., total consumer credit + home mortgage debt)
to personal income; 9) credit card charge-off rates; and io) credit
card delinquency rates.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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were "virtually identical to prior filing rates," indicating that bankruptcy
filings were likely to revert quickly to historic levels; (5) Chapter 7 filing
rates had a greater rate of increase prior to BAPCPA's effective date and,
correspondingly, had filing rates that, after BAPCPA's effective date, de-
clined faster than rates for Chapter 13 filings (Chapter 13 filings remained
essentially unchanged after BAPCPA); and (6) the ratio of Chapter 7 to
Chapter 13 filings shifted in light of BAPCPA, increasing prior to BAPCPA
and declining post-BAPCPA, with "a slight increase in the [Clhapter 7 per-
centage since the enactment of BAPCPA." 254
Part II of Professor Tabb's study examined the correlation of several
economic indicators to the consumer bankruptcy filing rate from 198o to
20o6.255 He found a very strong correlation between bankruptcy and revolv-
ing consumer credit, as well as strong correlations between bankruptcy and
six of the economic indicators he studied. 6 In essence, Professor Tabb
found that it likely was not abuse of the bankruptcy system that caused the
dramatic increase in consumer bankruptcy filings; rather, the bankruptcy
filing rate increase was more likely related to the increase in consumer credit
card debt. 257 He posited:
Changing the bankruptcy law to make it harder for consumer debt-
ors-as Congress did in 2005-may be a fool's errand. If revolving
credit continues to grow.., then these data suggest that nonbusi-
ness bankruptcy filings are likely to follow in like measure (unless
BAPCPA can somehow change history). The post-BAPCPA drop in
filings is likely to end, and soon, given the amount of outstanding
revolving consumer credit. Thus, if Congress really wants to slow or
even reverse the increase in bankruptcy filings, the real target
should be the underlying cause-credit card debt-and not the
bankruptcy law itself.258
He also noted, however, that since 2002, revolving credit had gone
down slightly each year and a "market saturation point" may have arisen
from the fact that there were few "untapped candidates for revolving con-
sumer credit out in the market place."259 Based on his observations, it is
254. Id. at 61.
255. Id. at 43.
256. Id. at 42.
257. Id. at ioo ("[G]iven that revolving credit is principally credit card debt [charts
lo and 11 in Tabb's article] indicate that the enormous increase in credit card
debt in the past quarter century may have helped trigger the correlative jump
in, and closely predicts the rate of, nonbusiness bankruptcy filings.").
258. Id.
259. Id. at loi.
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unlikely that there will be another "explosion" in revolving credit like the
one that occurred from 1983 to 1998; in turn, we are also unlikely to see the
"exponential increase" in consumer bankruptcies that occurred during that
time.260
Ultimately, Professor Tabb found that the bankruptcy filing rate post-
BAPCPA would soon return to the range of pre-BAPCPA levels, at least
once the anomalous periods just prior to and after BAPCPA's effective date
played out.2 61 Indeed, once bankruptcy rates return to their pre-BAPCPA
range, they are likely to remain stable over the next few years, because the
level of outstanding consumer credit seems to have leveled off.26
2
Probably the most comprehensive empirical study done in recent years
is the so-called Chapter 13 Project of Scott F. Norberg and Andrew J.
Velkey.263 Their study was national in scope, examining seven federal judi-
cial districts. Its purpose was to "provide a detailed picture of Chapter 13
bankruptcies and the extent to which Chapter 13 had achieved its objectives
of providing debtors fresh starts and creditor repayment." 2" Their study is
particularly important now that BAPCPA's means test has made it more
difficult for debtors to file for Chapter 7 relief. That is, in light of Chapter 7's
more stringent requirements, more debtors may choose, or be forced, into
filing Chapter 13 plans.265
The Chapter 13 Project studied 795 Chapter 13 cases filed in 1994 in 7
federal judicial districts.266 No fewer than ioo cases from each district were
included in the study based on a quota sample of 1% of the Chapter 13 cases
filed in each district in 1994.267 The study found several interesting things,
including the fact that at least 50% of the debtors had filed more than one
case and the fact that 1 in 7 debtors who received a discharge went on to file
another case.268 Forty-five percent of the cases involved proposed distribu-
tions that paid no more than 25% of unsecured claims versus 31% that pro-
260. Id.
261. See id. at 103.
262. Id. Professor Tabb also notes, however, that the recent increase in home
mortgage debt might point to an increase in non-business bankruptcy fil-
ings,though the significant drop in credit card charge-off rates "points the
other way." Id.
263. See Scott J. Norberg & Andrew J. Velkey, Debtor Discharge and Creditor Re-
payment in Chapter 13, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 473 (2006).
264. Id. at 475-76.
265. See id. at 478-79.
266. Id. at 479.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 476.
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posed to pay oo%. Fewer than io% proposed to pay between 26% and
99%.269
Norberg and Velkey also found that a large percentage of debtors pro-
posed repayment plans that were substantially longer than the 36 months
required by the code-most were near 60 months.2 70 Interestingly, those
debtors who proposed shorter repayment plans were more likely to com-
plete their plans, and joint filers were more likely than individual filers to
complete their plans.27' The Project also found that debtors who had com-
pleted their plans were usually those who were worse off when they had
filed. 2 The study found that less than 33% of the distributions under Chap-
ter 13 were to general unsecured creditors. 3 Debtors in the Chapter 13 pro-
ject, like debtors in previous studies, tended to be poor: The mean annual
household income of the debtors was less than 50% of that for all house-
holds, and the median was less than 60o%.274
IV. NON-BusINESs BANKRUPTCY FILING STATISTICS IN THE TENTH
CIRCUIT
Over the past three decades, consumer bankruptcies in America in-
creased dramatically, leading creditors to assert that the bankruptcy system
was being abused by debtors and in serious need of reform. 27 Looking at
the Tenth Circuit in the three year period pre-BAPCPA and the one-year
period post-BAPCPA, filing statistics appear to fall in line with the national
trend rising in the years prior to BAPCPA: Bankruptcy rates fell in the pe-
riod immediately post-BAPCPA and then rose once again.276 Pre-BAPCPA
269. Id. at 477.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. See id. (noting that debtors who completed their plans owed more debt pre-
bankruptcy and had higher debt-income ratios than those whose cases were
dismissed or converted and conjecturing that those who were more reluctant
to file in the first place were "more committed to doing what was necessary to
complete a plan").
273. Id. This is interesting because it is the unsecured creditors lobby that was
largely responsible for pushing BAPCPA; however, it appears that these credi-
tors may not be any better off under the new rules than they were under the
old.
274. Id. at 478.
275. See supra Section L.A (discussing consumer bankruptcy statistics between 1980
and 2005).
276. U.S. Bankruptcy Court filing statistics by chapter of the bankruptcy code can
be found at http://www.uscourts.gov/bnkrpctystats/statistics.htm. Full year
statistics for 2006 are not yet available so statistics for "the one-year period
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filings 2002-2004 show consumer filing rates that increased by approxi-
mately 11%. 277 During these years, Chapter 13 filings held steady at around
16,ooo per year, and Chapter 7 filings were largely responsible for the in-
crease in filings.
278
There was an anomoly in 2005, as the enactment of BAPCPA skewed fil-
ing statistics significantly higher. 279 That year saw a significant jump in non-
business bankruptcy filings in the Tenth Circuit.2s° In the fourth quarter of
2005 alone-the quarter BAPCPA took effect-there were 46,542 non-
business filings in the Tenth Circuit. 8 Almost 93% of these filings (43,179)
were for Chapter 7.282 This is most likely due to the rush to file for Chapter 7
liquidation before BAPCPA went into effect and made filing for Chapter 7
significantly more difficult.
2 3
post-BAPCPA" rely on quarterly statistics for September through December
2005 as well as quarterly statistics available through September 20o6. BAPCPA
went into effect during the fourth quarter of 2005, and statistics for that quar-
ter are very high relative to other quarters.
277. See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy Statistics, http://www.us-
courts.gov/bnkrpctystats/statistics.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2007) (providing
data about bankruptcy filings from 2002 to 2004 at "2002 by Chapter," "2003
Calendar Year by Chapter," and "2004 Calendar Year by Chapter" hyper-
links).
278. See id.
279. Overall non-business bankruptcy filings in the United States jumped by al-
most half a million filings from 2004 to 2005. Compare id. (providing data for
2005 at "2005 Calendar Year by Chapter" hyperlink), with id. (providing data
for 2004 at "2004 Calendar Year by Chapter" hyperlink). In the Tenth Circuit,
filings increased nearly 27% and all of the increase is attributable to Chapter 7
filings; Chapter 13 filings actually declined from over 16,ooo in 2004 to under
15,000 in 2005. See id.
280. See id.
281. Id. (providing data for 2005 at "2005 Calendar Year by Chapter" hyperlink).
282. Id.
283. Several scholars have written on the "rush to file" phenomenon that occurred
in the days leading up to BAPCPA's effective date. See, e.g., Sather, supra note
250, at 74 ("The imminent change in the bankruptcy laws was well known to
the bar and the public. As a result, many people sought to file before the new
law became effective. Some of these filers no doubt accelerated their decision
to file bankruptcy. Because of the change in the law, others may have filed
who would not otherwise have filed. ... There may have been some impulsive
or hysterical behavior at work.... Anecdotal evidence from the clerk's office
tells of people filing for bankruptcy despite not having any creditors. The au-
thor witnessed multiple instances of pro se debtors filing [C]hapter 7 and then
asking to dismiss their cases on the basis that they did not need to file in the
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Because filing statistics are not yet available for calendar year 2006, the
statistics discussed for the year post-BAPCPA are based on quarterly filing
statistics for the three months ending in December 2005 and the available
2006 quarterly statistics.284 As previously mentioned, fourth-quarter 2005
statistics are skewed very high and represent more than double the filings of
the subsequent three quarters."' The three months ending March 31, 2006
saw a dramatic decline in filings, totaling just 5292.286 Chapter 7 filings com-
prised 3843 (73%) of the total, and Chapter 13 filings comprised 1445 of the
total. The following quarter saw total filings jump to 8188, with Chapter 7
filings jumping to 6285 (76%).287 For the quarter ending September 30,
2006, filings again rose, totaling 8838.288
In terms of BAPCPA reducing the overall rate of Chapter 7 filings (one
of its key goals), the preliminary data show that BAPCPA has had modest
success, as Chapter 7 filings declined about 9% in the Tenth Circuit during
the studied period.289 Chapter 13 filings increased somewhat-from an aver-
age of 16% of filings to over 22%.290
first place."); see also Jayne S. Ressler, Civil Contempt Confinement and the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 20o5: An Exami-
nation of Debtor Incarceration in the Modern Age, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 355, 386
n.227 (2006); Tabb I, supra note 251, at 58.
284. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy Statistics, http://www.us-
courts.gov/bnkrpctystats/statistics.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2007) (providing
quarterly data about bankruptcy filings from September 2005 to September
2006 at "December 2005," "March 20o6," "June 2oo6," and "September 2006"
hyperlinks).
285. See id. Non-business filings in the Tenth Circuit during the three months
ending December 31, 2005 totaled more than 46,000. The combined non-
business filings for the subsequent three quarters totaled just over 22,300.
Compare id. (providing data for the final quarter of 2005 at "December 2005"
hyperlink), with id. (providing data for the first three quarters of 2005 at
"March 2005," "June 2005," and "September 2005" hyperlinks).
286. See id. (providing data for the first quarter of 2006 at "March 2oo6" hyper-
link).
287. See id. (providing data for the second quarter of 2006 at "June 2006" hyper-
link).
288. Id. (providing data for the third quarter of 2006 at "September 20o6" hyper-
link).
289. See supra note 285.
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V. METHODOLOGY AND STATISTICAL FINDINGS
Findings were based on data collected from the United States Bank-
ruptcy Courts of the Tenth Circuit, which handle cases from Colorado,
Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming. We originally in-
tended for there to be three data sets: (1) a random sample of Chapter 13
cases filed in 2002, (2) a proportional allocation sampling of Chapter 13
cases filed in 2004, and (3) a population data set for all Chapter 13 cases filed
post-BAPCPA (i.e., October 17, 2005 to October 16, 2oo6).
During the data collection process, we detected a huge spike in the
number of post-BAPCPA Chapter 13 cases filed starting around the end of
July 2006, approximately nine months after BAPCPA became effective. In
the interest of time and money, for the last three months of our study we
switched back to a proportional allocation sampling scheme similar to the
one used for the 2004 data set.
We conducted the analysis that follows on four data sets: (i) a random
sample of Chapter 13 cases filed in 2002 (Sample 2002), (2) a proportional
allocation sampling of Chapter 13 cases filed in 2004 (Sample 2004), (3) a
population data set for all Chapter 13 cases filed post-BAPCPA (i.e., October
17, 2005 to July 25, 20o6) (Population 2005-2oo6: Nine Months), and (4) a
proportional allocation sampling of Chapter 13 cases filed between July 2,
20o6, and October 16, 20o6 (Sample 2o06: Three Months).
A. Sampling Scheme
The sample plan for 2002 called for systematic sampling.29 1 We intended
to collect every n h case for a combined target sample size from all states in
the Tenth Circuit to be a minimum of 15o. This data set (Sample 2002) was
for benchmarking; we wanted to ensure that the data set would be similar
enough to past profiles of Chapter 13 filers that we could conduct a reason-
able analysis of pre-BAPCPA to post-BAPCPA data.
Since constraints required sampling of 2004 data, we decided that a
proportional allocation scheme would be most beneficial. A stratified sam-
ple with proportional allocation produces estimators with smaller variance
than that produced by simple random sampling when considerable variabil-
ity exists among the stratum means. 92 Additionally, if sampling costs are
nearly equal from stratum to stratum, stratified random sampling with op-
timal allocation yields estimators with smaller variance than proportional
allocation when there is variability among the stratum variances.293 While
290. See supra notes 278, 285.
291. See WILLIAM G. COCHRAN, SAMPLING TECHNIQUES (3d ed. 1977).
292. RICHARD L. SCHEAFFER ET AL., ELEMENTARY SURVEY SAMPLING 137 (6th ed.
2006).
293. COCHRAN, supra note 291, at 103.
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the different states did yield differing means, the variability and distribu-
tions were remarkably similar; therefore, we determined that a proportional
allocation sampling scheme was appropriate.
Statistical sampling and analysis have long been used in legal settings
and for policy making.9 4 Thus, we analyzed the bankruptcy data using de-
scriptive statistics, tests of significance, and predictive modeling. Using the
first loo Chapter 13 cases filed anywhere in the Tenth Circuit, we obtained
an estimate of the standard deviation in order to determine the minimum
necessary sample size under the proportion allocation sampling plan. Since
an important focus of this Article is the relative position of unsecured credi-
tors pre-BAPCPA and post-BAPCPA, we used the variable Total Unsecured
Debt for this estimate. The standard deviation for this variable for the first
loo cases in 2005 was 7865.295 A standard deviation is a measure of average
dispersion from the mean of the data set.296 The standard deviation is im-
portant because we can use this measure in conjunction with the mean of a
sample data set to estimate population measures from which the sample
data is derived. 297 For example, we may wish to know the average (mean)
amount of unsecured debt for all filers in 2004 and will estimate this
amount using the sample mean and standard deviation. This will produce
an interval estimate; we would say at a 95% confidence level the population
mean should fall between the lower bound and upper bound on the inter-
val. 29
8
The proportional allocation calculation yielded a minimum sample size
of n = 382.299 The decision was made to take this to n = 500 to allow for mis-
294. For an excellent treatise on the use of statistics in law and public policy, see i-
2 JOSEPH L. GASTWIRTH, STATISTICAL REASONING IN LAW AND PUBLIC POL-
iCY (1988).
295. See COCHRAN, supra note 291, at 276.
296.
MS = , (x x )
2
S= n-1
MICHAEL 0. FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 18-19(2d ed. 2001).
297. Id. at 172.
298. Id.
299.
n YNic 2  =
ND + I N, 
2
n
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coded data and other possible errors requiring case elimination. In addition,
secondary variables may have larger standard deviations. Using 50o as a
sample size and allocating to the strata (states) using
N
n =
produces the sample sizes per state shown in Table 1.300
This same proportional allocation sample scheme was applied to the
remaining three months of post-BAPCPA data with sample sizes per state
shown in Table 2.
700(7865)2 + 350(7865)2 + 80(7865)2 +1200(7865)2 + 550(7865)2
2880(750)2 700(7865)2 + 350(7865)2 + 80(7865)2 +1200(7865)2 + 550(7865)2
22 2880
-381.6
See SCHEAFFER ET AL., supra note 292, at 137.
300. See id.
Table i. Sample Sizes Per State--2004 Data*
Stratum N IN n,
co 8,912 398 22
NM 8,912 427 24
WVY 8,912 112 6
UT 8,912 3,435 193
OK 8,912 1,940 lo9
KS 8,912 2,6oo 146
Total 500
* Using proportional allocation sampling.
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Table 2. Sample Sizes Per State-2006 Data*
Stratum N N. n
CO 3,720 634 85
NM 3,720 238 32
WY 3,720 48 6
UT 3,720 833 112
OK 3,720 1,227 165
KS 3,720 740 100
Total 502
* Using proportional allocation sampling.
The following variables were collected from each bankruptcy case filed
for each of the four data sets (Sample 2002, Sample 2004, Population 2005-
20o6: Nine Months, Sample 20o6: Three Months). To the extent that Colo-
rado is the only state to have a standard Chapter 13 filing form required of
all filers, some states had missing data for some variables where Colorado is
for the most part complete.
The following variables were collected:
1. District (state of filing)
2. Dismissed (if the case was dismissed or not)
3. Attorney's Fees and Filing Costs
4. Total Tax (total taxes owed)
5. Total Unsecured Claims Under Plan (total number of unsecured
claims to be paid under the Chapter 13 plan)
6. Total All Types Debt Under Plan (total of all debt to be paid under
the Chapter 13 plan)
7. Trustee Compensation (total amount the trustees will earn from a
Chapter 13 plan)
8. Total All Types Debt Under Plan + Trustee (all debt to be paid under
Chapter 13 plan plus the trustee's compensation)
9. Non-Exempt Property if Chapter 7 (value of property that would be
non-exempt if Chapter 7 were filed instead of Chapter 13)
lo. Recoverable Property if Chapter 7 (value of property recoverable un-
der avoiding powers if Chapter 7 were filed instead of Chapter 13)
ii. Estimated Chapter 7 Adm. Fees (estimated Chapter 7 administrative
expenses)
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12. Estimated Unsecured Amount Paid if Chapter 7 (estimated amount
payable to class 4 creditors if Chapter 7 were filed instead of Chapter
13)
13. Estimated Unsecured Amount Paid for Chapter 13 (estimated amount
to be paid to unsecured creditors under the chapter 13 plan)
14. Excess Amount Available for Unsecured >_ o (the amount of unse-
cured creditors debt that is to be paid by the Chapter 13 plan-in
some cases, a negative amount was reported and this was recoded to
be o)
15. Value of Real Property Owned by Debtor
16. Value of Personal Property Owned by Debtor
17. Amount of Debt Secured by Interest in Property
18. Amount of Unsecured but Given Favorable Priority (amount of debt
that was unsecured but given favorable treatment)
19. Amount of Unsecured and Not Given Favorable Priority (amount of
unsecured debt not given favorable treatment)
20. Total Debt
21. Chapter 13 Total Plan To Pay / Total Debt (a ratio of the total
amount of debt that is to paid under the Chapter 13 plan to the total
amount of debt owed)
22. Unsecured Debt / Total Debt (a ratio of total unsecured debt owed to
the total debt owed)
23. Unsecured Owed - Unsecured Paid with Plan (total unsecured debt
owed less total unsecured debt paid by plan)
24. Total Unsecured Debt
B. Analysis
i. Is It Reasonable To Conclude the Sample 2004 Data Is Sufficiently
Similar to Sample 2002 Data To Use as the pre-BAPCPA Refer-
ence?
If the Sample 2004 data is to be the pre-BAPCPA reference, then it is
important that the earlier data shows a similar pattern to the distribution
with means that are not significantly different. While one might expect (un-
der a cost of living analysis) the mean to increase over those two years, we
are concerned with a large difference. °" The variable Total Unsecured
Claims is analyzed. The mean for Sample 2002 is $3,234.58 and the mean for
301. See FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra note 296, at 134-135.
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Sample 2004 is $3,570.68, a difference of $336.1o. In consideration of the
means comparison and the similarity in distributions (see Figures 1 and 2
below) on the key variable Total Unsecured Claims, it is reasonable to use the
Sample 2004 data as the pre-BAPCPA.













10000 14000 18000 22000 26000 30000
Total Unsecured Claims
Figure 2. 2004 Sample Data
uency
0 16000 32000 48000 64000 80000
8000 24000 40000 56000 72000
Total Unsecured Claims
2. How Does the Population 2005-2OO6: Nine Months Compare with
the Sample 2006: Three Months? Is It Reasonable To Combine
These for post-BAPCPA Analysis?
The mean amount of unsecured debt for the Population 2005-2006: Nine
Months is $5,078.93 and the mean for the Sample 2006: Three Months is
$5,234.61. While this does suggest that debtors are starting to have more
average unsecured debt over the latter part of the one year post-BAPCPA
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period, the difference of $155.68 is not sufficiently large to be significant (see
Figures 3 and 4 below). Additionally, the distributions of variables for these
two time periods are fairly similar. Combining these two time periods is
reasonable to represent post-BAPCPA data.







0-7500 37500 67500 97500 127500 157500 187500 217500
22500 52500 82500 112500 142500 172500 202500 232500
Total Unsecured Claims
Figure 4. Sample 2006: Three Months
Frequency
50-
0 12000 24000 36000 48000 60000 72000
Total Unsecured Claims
Unless otherwise specified, the data sets will consist of pre-BAPCPA
(Sample 2004 data) and post-BAPCPA (a combination of the population
data from the first nine months post-BAPCPA and the sample of the re-
maining three months of the first year post-BAPCPA).
3. Do the States Differ Significantly on Any Variable of Interest?
Working through all the variables, there are only two on which any state
varies greatly from all others. In the state of Utah, no taxes are reported as
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
owed by any filers. Table 3 below provides the average Taxes Owed by each
state for the post-BAPCPA data.
Additionally, the percent of cases out of Utah that are ultimately dis-




I%.UIUjIUU l'dl ldb New Oklahoma Utah Wyoming
Mexico
It is worthwhile to test if this difference is statistically significant. To do
this we use hypothesis testing to determine if the proportion dismissed in
Utah is significantly different from (either greater or less than) the propor-
tion dismissed for all other states. Using information about the sample pro-
portion and standard deviation for the sample proportions we derive a test
statistic that will let us know how far (as measured by the number of stan-
Table 3. Average Taxes Owed by State







*Includes one case in which $725,217 was owed.
If this case is excluded from the New Mexico
data, that state's average is $311.
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dard deviations) one sample proportion is from all the other sample pro-
portions combined."'
When the resulting z-score or t-score (a number indicating how many
standard deviations the sample proportion is from the other sample propor-
tions) is large, it may be sufficient evidence that one population proportion
is different from another. The z-score or t-score is reported along with a
p-value. The p-value is the probability associated with a z-score or t-score.
The p-value represents the risk one actually needs to take of making a mis-
take when concluding that one population proportion is different from
another.30 3 A p-value that is quite small is indicative of compelling evidence
to reject the equality of the population proportions, while one that is rela-
tively large suggests that the proportions may be similar.30 4
The test statistic for the test is z = -5.65 and the p-value associated with
this z-score is < .ooi. This is strong evidence to refute the assumption that
the population proportions are equal, and it is reasonable to conclude that
Utah has a higher proportion of percent dismissed than other states. If there
really is no difference in the proportions, the number of standard deviations
Utah's proportion would be from the other states' proportions (the test
statistic z-score) would be within about two. This observation, z = -5.65,
falls far from the two standard deviations criteria; it falls more than five
standard deviations. We would say this is very unlikely to occur by chance if
the proportions are really approximately equal. The probability it could
occur by chance is the p-value <.ool. More specifically the p-value is
.ooooooo16; only sixteen in one billion times will this occur by chance.3 5
While both Tax Paid and Proportion of Dismissal Percent show that
states are not equivalent on every variable measured, neither of these two
variables were used in the models developed. All other variables were meas-
ured to be about the same across the six states. There may be some social
construct at work here for these differences; that would go beyond the scope
of this paper and perhaps be a topic for future research
302.
Z - (P1 - P2) where p, = X1 + X 2Pc(1-P,:) + /PX(-Pc) n, +n2
n, n2
See FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra note 296, at 120-122.
303. SHIRLEY DOWDY ET AL., STATISTICS FOR RESEARCH 15-16 (3d ed. 2004).
304. Id.
305. JEROME L. MYERS & ARNOLD D. WELL, RESEARCH DESIGN AND STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS 119-22 (2d ed. 2003).
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C. Impact Assessment: Has the Financial Profile of the Debtor Under
Chapter 13 Changed Pursuant to the New Laws?
We now consider the impact of the change in bankruptcy laws. Specifi-
cally, did these changes in the bankruptcy filing rules have an impact on
intended targets?
3°6
To answer this question we will look at several variables, comparing
Sample 2004 data to 2006 Combined data:
I. Value of Real Property Owned by Debtor
2. Value of Personal Property Owned by Debtor
3. Amount of Debt Secured by Interest in Property
4. Total Debt
5. Chapter 13 Total Plan To Pay / Total Debt
6. Unsecured Debt / Total Debt
7. Total Unsecured Debt
Table 4 below summarizes the data for comparing pre-BAPCPA and
post-BAPCPA.
306. For an interesting discussion of evaluation research, see BURKE JOHNSON &
LARRY CHRISTENSEN, EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH 10 (2d ed. 2004).
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Table 4. Pre- and post-BAPCPA Comparison




Testing for Significance of <.001
Difference 4.44 <.o




Testing for Significance of 2.62 <.01
Difference
Amount of Debt Secured by A 1
Interest in Property Average t-score p-value
Mean pre-BAPCPA $72,16o
Mean post-BAPCPA $92,156
Testing for Significance of 4.5 <.001
Difference 4.56 _.oo1
Total Debt Average t-score p-value
Mean pre-BAPCPA $105,165
Mean post-BAPCPA $132,041
Testing for Significance of
Difference 5.09 <.001
Chapter 13 Total Plan to Pay Average t-score p-value
/ Total Debt I A
Mean pre-BAPCPA .2858
Mean post-BAPCPA .2270
Testing for Significance of
Difference -4.71 <.001
Unsecured Debt / Total Debt ]- Average t-score p-value
Mean pre-BAPCPA -4375
Mean post-BAPCPA .4058
Testing for Significance of
Difference -1.83 <.10
Total Unsecured Debt Average t-score p-value
Mean pre-BAPCPA $33,005
Mean post-BAPCPA $39,884
Testing for Significance of
Difference -2.91 <.01
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The value of real property owned, the value of personal property owned,
and the amount of debt secured by interest in property have all shown a
statistically significant change from pre-BAPCPA to post-BAPCPA and they
have all increased. This would suggest a better-situated debtor from the
perspective of what is owned. The total debt has shown a statistically signifi-
cant change from pre-BAPCPA to post-BAPCPA with an increase here also.
Preliminarily, these findings seem to be in alignment with the stated
goals of BAPCPA. Individuals who have more and owe more are being
channeled into repayment plans. Presumably, other things being equal,
many of these debtors would have chosen to file a Chapter 7 petition for
relief and would not have voluntarily chosen to enter into a repayment plan.
We must caution, however, that we cannot discount the possibility that the
large number of filers who filed for relief immediately prior to the enact-
ment of BAPCPA is distorting the findings.
D. Efficiency Assessment
We now look at the cost effectiveness of the new bankruptcy laws. Spe-
cifically, what is the overall effect on the debtor and the creditors?
1. Are Debtors in a Better or Worse Financial Position Under the
New Laws?
Table 5 below provides the amount of unsecured debt (not given favor-
able treatment) per dollar paid by debtors in repayment plans for pre-
BAPCPA and post-BAPCPA comparison.
Table 5. Unsecured Debt To Be Repaid to Unsecured
Debt Owed-Pennies on the Dollar
307
TimepriodAverage Dollars To Be Paid/Time eriodAverage Dollars Owed
Pre-BAPCPA 224
Post-BAPCPA 394
Table 5 illustrates a dramatic finding from the study. Unsecured credi-
tors are scheduled to be repaid an average of 77% more post BAPCPA. This
provides at least preliminary evidence that one of the stated goals of
BAPCPA-to increase the percentage of unsecured debt repaid to credi-
tors-is proving effective. Along with the concern that the immediately pre-
307. Prior to calculating the values in this table, the data was recoded to reflect
values of no more than ioo% for the amount that was paid divided by the
amount that was owed. In the original data there were many instances in
which debtors were shown to pay substantially more to unsecured creditors
(not given priority) than what was owed to these creditors. We assumed these
were data entry errors.
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BAPCPA filers are distorting these figures, we must add the additional cau-
tionary note that this finding is only measuring unsecured debt scheduled to
be repaid. It does not measure debt actually repaid. States have vastly differ-
ent plan failure rates, and the effect of more debtors filing Chapter 13 plans
provides an additional unknown factor. Whether the increased percentage
of debt scheduled to be repaid to unsecured creditors results in increased
payments made to unsecured creditors remains to be seen.
Table 6. Changes for Average Debtor Post-BAPCPA
Total Debt $26,876 increase
Attorney's Fees and Filing Costs $658 increase
Trustee's Compensation $335 decrease
Total $27,i99 change
2. Are Unsecured Creditors in a Better or Worse Financial Position
Under the New Laws?
We will look at the unsecured creditors' relative standing in terms of
amount of debt owed to them and not paid by the Chapter 13 plan. While
not showing a statistically significant difference (t-score = .66, p-value >.5),
it is interesting to note that the difference between what is owed to all unse-
cured creditors (both those given favorable priority and all others) less the
amount paid to these unsecured creditors has increased from the pre-
BAPCPA amount of $27,913 to the post-BAPCPA amount of $29,391, mean-
ing that on average the unsecured creditor is seeing a widening gap ($1,478)
between what is owed and what is paid. Figures 6 and 7 below show the
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3. What Are the Amounts in Total Dollars for post-BAPCPA Data
for Some Variables of Interest?
Table 7 shows the totals in terms of dollars for these variables over the
first nine months of post-BAPCPA filings; population data was used.
Table 7. Aggregate Payments for Various Interested Parties--Nine Months
Interested Parties Total
Total Available for All Unsecured Creditors $15,538,385
Total Amount Owed to All Unsecured Creditors $88i8But Not Paid$8,114
E. Prediction
We shall consider the relative merits of two models used to predict vari-
ables. Since Colorado was the only state with complete, standardized forms,
we will limit our models to Colorado and use only the pre-BAPCPA data
(sample data from 2004). We will first consider a model to predict Total
Debt (the dependent variable). The independent variables (the ones we will
use to predict Total Debt) are Value of Real Property Owned, Estimated Unse-
cured Amount Paid, and Unsecured Owed Less Unsecured Paid. SAS Output
for the linear regression model, Table 8, is shown below.3°8
Ypred = a + bi x I + b 2 x 2 + b n x n
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Table 8. Linear Regression Predicting Total Debt: Colorado pre-BAPCPA
Analysis of Variance
Source DF Sum of Mean F Value Pr > FSquares Square
Model 3 4.478765E11 1.492922El 443.50 <.0001












Variable DF ter dard t Value Pr > It
Estimate Error
Intercept 1 16147 3516.38 4.59 <.0001
Value of








Unsecured 0.95661 0.0437 21.89 <.0001
Paid
The regression equation is:
Predicted Total Debt = 16147 + 0.79001 (Value of Real Property
Owned) + 5.46376 (Estimated Unsecured Amount Paid) + 0.95661
(Unsecured Owed - Unsecured Paid)
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All independent variables have p-values <.oool, which means they are
all useful to the model in the presence of the other independent variables.309
The p-value associated with the statistics that addresses the issue of whether
there is at least one useful variable in the model is <.oool.31 ° The R2 of .9652
tells us that 96.5% of the variation in Total Debt is explained or accounted
for by looking at the variation in Value of Real Property Owned, Estimated
Unsecured Amount Paid, and Unsecured Owed Less Unsecured Paid.3"1 Based
on all the p-values, this is a reasonable model. 12 In other words, we have
found that pre-BAPCPA, the variables that are useful predictors for Total
Debt are Value of Real Property Owned, Estimated Unsecured Amount Paid,
and Unsecured Owed Less Unsecured Paid.
The regression equation is interpreted as follows:
* A one unit increase in Value of Real Property Owned is associ-
ated with a .79 increase in Predicted Total Debt.
" A one unit increase in Estimated Unsecured Amount Paid is as-
sociated with a 5.46 increase in Predicted Total Debt.
* A one unit increase in Unsecured Owed Less Unsecured Paid is
associated with a .96 increase in Predicted Total Debt.
Since these variables are all in dollars, we can see that a si increase in the
Estimated Unsecured Amount Paid is associated with the largest change in
Predicted Total Debt, an increase of $5.46. Pre-BAPCPA, it seems that unse-
cured debt paid was a lynchpin for understanding the debt structure of the
debtor. If we are told the amount that the debtor repaid unsecured credi-
tors, we could make a fairly reasonable estimate of the total debt the debtor
owed.
Table 9 below provides a similar analysis for post-BAPCPA Colorado
data linear regression modeling.
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Table 9. Linear Regression Predicting Total Debt: Colorado post-BAPCPA
Analysis of Variance
Source DF Sum of Mean FFSquares Square Value
Model 3 1.660137E12 5.53379E11 470-93 <.0001











Variable DF Parameter Standard t Value Pr > It[
Estimate Error
Intercept 1 9784.71922 5598.59025 1.75 0.0834
Value of
Real








Given Fa- 1.97383 0.05717 17.o4 <.0001
vorable
Treatment
This regression equation using the post-BAPCPA data indicates that a
different collection of variables are useful in predicting total debt and are
interpreted as follows:
* A one unit increase in Value of Real Property Owned is associ-
ated with a .95 increase in Predicted Total Debt.
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* A one unit increase in Fair Market Value of Collateral is associ-
ated with a .23 increase in Predicted Total Debt.
* A one unit increase in Amount of Unsecured Not Given Favor-
able Treatment is associated with a .97 increase in Predicted To-
tal Debt.
Since these variables are all in dollars, we can see that a si increase in the
Amount of Unsecured Not Given Favorable Treatment is associated with the
largest change in Predicted Total Debt, an increase of just under a dollar.
We find that the mix of important variables for predicting Total Debt
pre-BAPCPA to post-BAPCPA has changed. They were Value of Real Prop-
erty Owned, Estimated Unsecured Amount Paid, and Unsecured Owed Less
Unsecured Paid; now they are Value of Real Property Owned, Fair Market
Value of Collateral, and Amount of Unsecured and Not Given Favorable
Treatment. As we discuss below, we are unsure how to explain this change.
In this next model we will use logistic regression analysis to predict
whether or not a Chapter 13 case is dismissed." 3 The purpose of logistic
regression is to predict a case group membership on the dependent variable
by calculating the probability that a case will belong to the 1 = yes cate-
gory.314 The following variables were considered in developing the model:
1. Amount of Unsecured and Not Given Favorable Priority (amount of
unsecured debt not given favorable treatment)
2. Total Debt
3. Unsecured Debt/ Total Debt (a ratio of total unsecured debt owed to
the total debt owed)
4. Total Unsecured Debt
5. Value of Real Property Owned by Debtor
6. Value of Personal Property Owned by Debtor
7. Amount of Unsecured but Given Favorable Treatment (amount of
debt that was unsecured but given favorable treatment)
8. Trustee Compensation (total amount the trustees will earn from a
Chapter 13 plan)
9. Total Tax (total taxes owed)
313.
In[odds] = a + bix1 + b2x 2 +... + bnx n
g,, = In[odds] = a + blx1 + b2x 2 + bnXn
314. See LAWRENCE S. MEYERS ET AL., APPLIED MULTIVARIATE RESEARCH 221-26
(2006).
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lo. Attorney's Fees and Filing Costs
ii. Dismissed (if the case was dismissed or not)
Our dependent variable is Dismissed (o=no, i=yes), and the independ-
ent variables that ultimately proved useful315 in predicting whether or not a
case would be dismissed are Value of Real Property Owned (in thousands),
Amount of Unsecured Debt Given Favorable Treatment (in thousands), Total
Debt (in thousands), and Trustee's Compensation (in thousands). See Table
lo below.
Table io. Logistic Regression Results
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA = 0
Chi- Pr > Chi
Square Sq
Likelihood
Ratio 4 24.9032 <.0001
Score 4 14.2350 o.0066
Wald 4 8.5121 0.0745
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Esti- Standard WaldParameter DF mate Error Chi- Pr > ChiSqSquare
Intercept 1 -0.2099 0.7986 o.o691 0,7927
Value of
Real Prop-










315. It is interesting to note that neither individually nor in combination with
other variables were the following variables useful for predicting dismissal:
Amount of Unsecured and Not Given Favorable Priority, Total Debt, Unsecured
Debt/Total Debt, Total Unsecured Debt, Total Tax, Attorney's Fees and Filing
Costs, and Value of Personal Property Owned by Debtor.
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Total Debt
in Thou- 1 -0.0479 0.0202 5.6054 0.0179
sands
Trustee





Effect Point Estimate ConfidConfidence Limits
Value of
Real Prop-















tion in 1.189 9.924
thousands
An absolute measure of validity of the logistic regression model is the
likelihood ratio test.316 Here we see this is associated with a p-value of
<.OOOl so we conclude the model is valid. With a p-value of <.05 Total Debt
in Thousands and Trustee Compensation in Thousands are useful to the
model. At p-values <.1o Value of Real Property Owned in Thousands and
Amount of Unsecured Debt Given Favorable Treatment in Thousands are
useful to the model.
The odds ratio estimates provide some interesting information. If the
chances of something occurring are greater than the chances of it not occur-
ring, the odds will be greater than 1. If the chances of an event failing to
occur are greater, the odds will be less than 1.317 We find the following:
316. See MEYERS, supra note 314, at 238.
317. See, e.g., DAVID W. HOSMER & STANLEY LEMESHOW, APPLIED LOGISTIC RE-
GRESSION 242 (2d ed. 2000).
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" The odds of a case being dismissed are 4.875 times greater with
an additional thousand dollars in Amount of Unsecured Debt
Given Favorable Treatment.
* The odds of a case being dismissed are 1.029 times greater with
an additional thousand dollars in Value of Real Property Owned.
* The odds represents a .05 (1 - 0.953) reduction in risk of a case
being dismissed with an additional thousand dollars in Total
Debt.
* The odds of a case being dismissed are 3.434 times greater for a
case with an additional thousand dollars in Trustee Compensa-
tion. This finding may just be measuring the fact that trustees
invest greater amounts of time and receive greater compensa-
tion in cases in which they play a role in getting the case dis-
missed.
All variables with the exception of Total Debt are associated with an in-
crease in likelihood of dismissal. Total Debt is associated with a decrease in
likelihood of dismissal. Another way to think about these odds ratio esti-
mates is in terms of the effect of an additional thousand dollars in any one
of these independent variables on the predicted odds of dismissal.318 An
additional thousand dollars in Amount of Unsecured Debt Given Favorable
Treatment increases the predicted odds of dismissal by 387% (4.875 - 1). An
additional thousand dollars in Value of Real Property Owned increases the
predicted odds of dismissal by 2.9% (1.029 - 1). An additional thousand dol-
lars in Trustee Compensation increases the predicted odds of dismissal by
243% (3.434 - 1). An additional thousand dollars in Total Debt decreases the
predicted odds of dismissal by 5% (0.953 - 1). Amount of Unsecured Debt
Given Favorable Treatment and Trustee Compensation clearly have the big-
gest impact on prediction of dismissal.
This model can be used to predict likelihood of dismissal.319 The data
used for the model came from the state of Colorado only and since post-
BAPCPA cases have insufficient time for most dismissal to surface, we are
limited to the pre-BAPCPA data for Colorado. This data set has a sample
size of 52, small in terms of building a predictive model but adequate as a
starting point for investigating the predictive model with recommendations
for follow-up studies with larger sample sizes and additional districts.
318. See id.
319.
ggpred /(1 + gpred) = predicted - probability
See MEYERS, supra note 314, at 231-33.
201
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The logistic regression model is:
Dismissalp,,dia = -. 2099 + .o281 (Value of Real Property Owned in
Thousands) + 1.5841 (Amount of Unsecured Debt Given Favorable
Treatment in Thousands) - .0479 (Total Debt in Thousands) + 1.2338
(Trustee Compensation in Thousands)
Suppose we have a debtor with the following values for these variables
(Tables 11 and 12):
Table 11. Hypothetical Debtor Profile 1
Dollar
Variable Amount In Thousands of Dollars
Value of Real Property $16o ooo $16o
Owned _16oooo__ 6
Unsecured Debt Given
Favorable Treatment $9,000 $9
Total Debt $250,000 $250
Trustee Compensation $4,500 $4.5
Table 12. Hypothetical Debtor Profile 1 Applied to Model
Variable (A) Coefficient (B) In Thousands (A) times
of Dollars (B)
Model Constant -.2099 -.2099
Value of Real
Property Owned .0281 $160 4.50
Unsecured Debt
Given Favorable 1.5841 $9 14.26
Treatment
Total Debt -.0479 $250 -11.98
Trustee
Compensation 1"2338 $4.5 5.55
SUM 12.12
The Dismissalprdicted = 12.12. The following equation will provide the pre-
dicted probability that this particular case will be dismissed:
Predicted Probability = 2.7171212/(1+2.718) 12.12 = 0.022436
This case has a low probability of being dismissed, 2%. Probabilities
range from o to i and any predicted probability greater than .50 means dis-
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missal is likely.32° We now predict for a debtor with a different set of values
for the variables (Tables 16 and 17).
Table 13. Hypothetical Debtor Profile 2
Variable Dollar In Thousands of
Amount Dollars
Value of Real Property Owned $16,ooo $16
Unsecured Debt Given Favor-
able Treatment $40,00 $4
Total Debt $250,000 $250
Trustee Compensation $4,500 $4.5
Table 14. Hypothetical Debtor Profile 2 Applied to Model
(B) In Thou- (A) times
Variable (A) Coefficient sands of Dol- (B)
lars
Model Constant -. 2099 -. 2099
Value of Real
Property Owned .o281 $16 .45
Unsecured Debt
Given Favorable 1.5841 $4 6.34
Treatment
Total Debt -. 0479 $250 -11.98
Trustee
Compensation 1.2338 $4.5 5-55
SUM .15
The Dismissal eed =o .15. The following equation will provide the pre-
dicted probability that this particular case will be dismissed:
Predicted Probability = 2.717*'/(1+2.718)"'= 0.953153
This case has a high probability of being dismissed, 95%. With a larger data
set and sufficient time for post-BAPCPA cases to make their way through
the Chapter 13 system, a more robust predictive model could be built and
validated. This type of model could be very useful to courts and other inter-
ested parties as debtors find themselves facing bankruptcy.
320. See id.
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F. Predicting Dismissal Rates post-BAPCPA?
The post-BAPCPA data is truncated since we have only one year of cases
beginning with October 2005. Due to this, many potential dismissals have
yet to appear. A very tentative model for predicting future Colorado dis-
missals with fairly speculative values can be obtained using the logistic re-
gression model variables from pre-BAPCPA. The following variables from
Colorado pre-BAPCPA were used in a discriminant analysis to predict
probabilities associated with each case being dismissed: Value of Real Prop-
erty Owned, Unsecured Debt Given Favorable Treatment, and Total Debt. The
resulting predictions are listed below in Table 15.
Table 15. Actual and Estimated Dismissal Rates Colorado
Pre-BAPCPA Colorado Dismissal Rates 32.7% Actual Rate
Post-BAPCPA Colorado Dismissal Rates 37.2% Predicted Rate
VI. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
Our study offers some preliminary empirical findings and models,
points to the necessity of focusing the debate on the available empirical evi-
dence, and provides a call for further research in other jurisdictions and
over longer periods of time. The study also provides an analysis of the avail-
able empirical evidence on whether BAPCPA was enacted in response to a
genuine social problem or in response to rhetorical posturing and reviews
the debates that underlay BAPCPA. It reports a number of statistically sig-
nificant findings, some of which we can analyze only preliminarily. Still,
these findings are important to make available to other researchers. Below
we lay out our major findings and begin the process of explaining the impli-
cations that may flow from our findings, if they are replicated elsewhere and
over time.
First, has the profile of Chapter 13 filers who confirm plans changed pre-
BAPCPA as compared to post-BAPCPA? We answer this question in two
ways. Descriptively, the profile of debtors has changed in important ways.
Compared with the pre-BAPCPA debtor, the post-BAPCPA debtor on aver-
age owns more expensive real property and has more personal property.
The value of debtors' real property increased by 32.7% and the value of per-
sonal property owned by the debtor increased by 23.3%. At the same time,
debtors' average amount of debt has also increased. The amount of debt
secured by real property jumped 27.7%; total unsecured debt increased by
20.8%; and total debt overall increased by 25.6%.
It is interesting to consider whether these findings are consistent with
what we would predict from a system that aims to channel more debtors
into filing Chapter 13 repayment plans instead of Chapter 7 liquidations.
The average Chapter 13 debtor post-BAPCPA both has more and owes
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more. It might be argued that this finding reveals a benefit of BAPCPA. The
changes have forced higher-wealth individuals, who also have more debt,
into plans in which they must repay a portion of their debts.
Using regression models, we also examine whether we can predict the
total debt of a post-BAPCPA bankruptcy filer. This is analogous to asking
prospective bankruptcy filers about their total debt and seeing how close we
can come to predicting their responses.32" ' While other factors in the model
are also important, most significantly we find that unsecured debt paid is
the best predictor of total debt. If random Chapter 13 debtor A told us that
she was going to pay sooo in unsecured debt under the plan and random
debtor B told us that he was going to pay $2000 in unsecured debt, we
would predict that B had $546o more total debt. Post-BAPCPA, however,
the regression model does not have such a dramatic predictor. In fact, the
model has shown that the landscape has changed; post-BAPCPA the same
set of variables are not useful in predicting total debt.
We struggle to explain this change. We are not sure why the regression
model that worked pre-BAPCPA does not work post-BAPCPA. We are also
unsure why unsecured debt to be paid under the plan is no longer strongly
predictive of changes in total debt. We believe that the answer will come
with time. Still, modeling of this type is important, even with the caveat that
our model may need refining post-BAPCPA. Modeling aids public policy
decisionmaking and will allow researchers to test BAPCPA's effectiveness at
accomplishing Congress's goals. For example, if researchers could pinpoint
the variables that predict which individuals will seek bankruptcy protection,
or which factors are associated with large changes in total debt, Congress
could address those issues more effectively. To the extent that a variable is
within the control of an individual (e.g., the decision to purchase real prop-
erty or have a mortgage of a certain amount), changes in the Bankruptcy
Code can provide incentives or disincentives to the behavior. To the extent
the relevant variable is associated with societal issues such as a lack of health
care, it is important for Congress to be able to target the greater social prob-
lem and not attempt to alter individual behavior with incentives or disin-
centives in the Bankruptcy Code.
Has BAPCPA been a win for unsecured creditors? The data to date indi-
cates that the average Chapter 13 debtor is repaying a far greater percentage
of his or her unsecured debt. Debtors post-BAPCPA have confirmed plans
that average repayments of their general unsecured debt of $0.39 on the
321. Imagine forming a model to predict weight based on questions about height,
genetics, eating habits, and level of activity. If we could form a robust model
to predict weight based on these factors, we could determine whether small
changes in the behavior over which an individual has control would have a
large effect on weight, or whether weight is due largely to factors beyond an
individual's control.
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dollar as compared to $0.22 on the dollar pre-BAPCPA. A 77% average in-
crease is a dramatic jump in repayment. 2
Also, far fewer debtors are filing bankruptcy. Does this reflect the fact
that debtors who are looking for an easy way to avoid repaying their debts
have realized it will be harder for them to utilize the bankruptcy system to
get an easy forgiveness of their obligations? Or does this reflect a "hangover
effect" from the large number of debtors who filed bankruptcy before
BAPCPA went into effect or attorneys' and debtors' unfamiliarity with the
new system? If so, the number of filers should steadily increase, an effect
that cannot yet be measured. Though we do see increases in the number of
filers in the last quarter of the study, it is not clear if this represents a trend
or simply seasonal anomalies.
Finally, we know that a certain percentage of debtors who confirm
Chapter 13 plans will fail to make the required payments and have their
Chapter 13 cases dismissed. This number varies by state. We have developed
a logistic regression model to predict who will fail their plans. To our
knowledge, this is the first published research attempting to predict such
behavior. We believe this to be the first time such modeling has been done.
We hope that our attempts, however preliminary, will draw attention to the
necessity of empirical research to determine which factors are predictive of
an individual failing to complete his or her plan. Such research has implica-
tions for public policy, attorneys advising clients, and judges and trustees
exercising discretion in plan content and approval.
If researchers can develop robust models of the issues facing debtors,
models that predict which variables are associated with failure to complete
plans, then lawmakers can alter the requirements for plan confirmation in
an informed and non-ideological fashion. Attorneys can make adjustments
in plan details or counsel clients to explore other financial options. Judges
and trustees can help debtors not confirm plans, or adjust their financial
planning, to avoid failure. And to the extent that we can use logistic regres-
sion models to predict changes in failure rates post-BAPCPA, we can under-
stand whether BAPCPA has been effective in channeling a greater percent-
age of debtors into Chapter 13 plans.
In developing our model, what we did not find is in some ways as in-
structive as what we did find. We started off trying to develop a profile of a
debtor who would be unlikely to complete his or her confirmed plan. In
essence, we tried to model the classic picture of irresponsible debtors on the
assumption they would be least likely to make their required plan payments.
We tried logistic regression modeling of (1) debtors who had the highest
general unsecured debt, (2) debtors who had the highest general unsecured
322. On the other hand, while total unsecured debt has increased, the ratio of
unsecured debt to total debt has decreased. Perhaps the unsecured creditors
have made some gains.
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debt relative to the value of their real property, (3) debtors who had the
highest real property values, and (4) debtors with the highest total debt.
None of these models were robust individually or in interaction.
The model that we ultimately derived from the 2004 data on failure
rates of confirmed Chapter 13 plans in 2004 is based on an interaction of the
value of real property, the amount of priority unsecured debt, total debt,
and trustee compensation. We find that every additional $1ooo of priority
unsecured debt increases the predicted odds of dismissal by 387%. An in-
crease in the amount of each of the other independent variables in the
model predicts an increase in the likelihood of failure. The only exception is
in the amount of total debt. An additional sooo of total debt decreases the
predicted odds of dismissal by 5%.
We struggle to understand why this was the only model that was predic-
tive of debtors who would have their plans dismissed. Unsecured priority
debt is essentially composed of domestic support obligations, attorneys'
fees, and taxes.3 23 An increase in this category may indicate that the addi-
tional burden of repaying tax obligations, making domestic support pay-
ments or paying attorneys represents an additional cost that debtors living
paycheck to paycheck cannot absorb.
An increase in this category is so strongly predictive of failure that it
may have public policy implications if the model is found to be robust
across jurisdictions and over time. When this model is applied to post-
BAPCPA confirmed cases, we find an increase in failure rates from 32.7% to
37.2 %. Of course, there are a number of issues that are raised by using a
logistic regression model to predict future rates of failure. As we outlined,
the economic profile of debtors and the amount paid to attorneys post-
BAPCPA is different than pre-BAPCPA. In attempting to apply the same
model to post-BAPCPA data, we may be comparing apples and oranges. We
will not know until more time has gone by for post-BAPCPA Chapter 13
debtors to fail to complete their plans. That said, the need for empirical
scholars to develop increasingly robust models to predict failure is para-
mount.
In conclusion, this study is the first of its kind to statistically test the
impact and unanticipated consequences of BAPCPA. We have attempted to
situate these findings within the greater context of the available empirical
data and theories to explain the triggers for filing for bankruptcy protection
and highlight some of the debate on BAPCPA found in the Congressional
Record. While BAPCPA has not been in effect for enough time for us to
make definitive public policy recommendations, we hope our work will
323. See ii U.S.C. § 507(a) (2000) (listing which unsecured creditors receive prior-
ity and in what order). We were not able to disaggregate which of these cate-
gories was most predictive of failure to obtain a discharge.
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serve as a call for and a focus on the validity and important of empirical
legal research in the area of bankruptcy.
